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I. Parallel Proceedings/Antisuit Injunctions
A. INTRODucrION
The general approach of U.S. courts to litigation in multiple forums is to allow parallel
proceedings to continue simultaneously "at least until a judgment is reached in one which can
be pled as res judicata in the other."' Once one suit has reached judgment, the prevailing
party generally seeks to foreclose further action in the remaining suit.' Since the accepted rule
encourages parallel litigation in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the initiation of one or more
suits involving the same parties and claims is not in and of itself a basis for granting an antisuit
injunction.
It is clear that while the courts have the power to enjoin foreign suits by parties over whom
they have jurisdiction,' the remedy is considered extreme and therefore difficult to obtain.4
While the injunctive relief sought is technically against the parties rather than the foreign court,
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1. Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 926-27 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (footnote
omitted).
2. See, e.g., Scheiner v. Wallace, 832 F. Supp. 687, 693 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), dismissed, sanctions disallowed,
860 F. Supp. 991 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). The recognition and potential enforcement of the foreign judgment
might lead to dismissal or a stay of the parallel proceedings. See, e.g., Alfadda v. Fenn, 1996 WL 290049
(S.D.N.Y. May 30, 1996).
3. Laker, 731 F.2d at 926.
4. For a recent example enjoining parallel litigation abroad in connection with bankruptcy, see In re Petition
of Laitasalo, 196 B.R. 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). For an example in the context of arbitral awards, see Matter of
Arbitration Between Chromalloy Aeroservices and Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996).
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the impact and the offense to the other court's jurisdiction and sovereignty is as obvious. Thus,
this power should be used sparingly.
Federal courts deciding whether to enjoin parallel proceedings in foreign forums generally
divide into two camps:! those that follow the Laker "sparingly used" approach6 and those that
use the more liberal approach of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits. Assuming that identity of parties
and the resolution of the case in the enjoining court would be dispositive of the action being
enjoined, courts look to see if there is an exception to the general rule favoring concurrent
litigation. The Laker approach recognizes exceptions when the injunction is necessary (1) to
protect the enjoining court's jurisdiction or (2) to protect important public policy of the forum.
"[D]uplication of parties and issues alone is not sufficient to justify the issuance of an antisuit
injunction." 7 The policies of "avoiding hardship to parties and promoting the economies of
consolidated litigation" are not the basis for antisuit injunctions but more appropriately for
forum non conveniens motions.'
The liberal standard of enjoining parallel proceedings in cases of duplicative litigation, as
illustrated by the Fifth and Ninth Circuit approaches, accords less weight to comity and more
to whether the litigation is vexatious or would result in "inequitable hardship" and "tend to
frustrate and delay the speedy and efficient determination of the cause."'
The most recent case continuing the split among the circuits is Kaepa, Inc. from the Fifth
Circuit." The appellate court here affirmed the district court's grant of an antisuit injunction,
without security, in connection with a mirror image lawsuit filed in Japan by the defendant
in the U.S. litigation. The court, finding that the case was basically a private contract dispute,
refused to ',give greater deference to comity"" and continued to adhere to the position it had
taken in earlier cases and that followed by the Ninth and Seventh Circuits.' 2
5. For a thorough discussion of the two approaches to antisuit injunctions, see generally George Bermann,
Tbe Use ofAnti-Suit Injunctions in InernationalLitigation, 28 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 589 (1990); Note, Antisuit
Injunctions and Inernational Comity, 71 VA. L. Rv. 1039 (1985); LouisE ELLEN TErrz, TRANSNATIONAL LrrIGATION
23 3-50 (1996).
6. Laker, 731 F.2d at 926. The case itself provides a lengthy history of the litigation, id. at 917-21, as well
as a description of proceedings in England. See also British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways t 1984] 3 W.L.R. 413.
7. Laker, 731 F.2d at 928 (footnote omitted).
8. Id.
9. Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 632 (5th Cir. 1996) (reviewing cases). The broader test,
illustrated by a five-factor analysis in American Home Assurance Co. v. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, incorporates the
interests of the parties and the judicial system in efficient dispute resolution:
[Flive factors are suggested in determining whether the foreign action should be enjoined:
(1) frustration of a policy in the enjoining forum; (2) the foreign action would be vexatious;
(3) a threat to the issuing court's in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction; (4) the proceedings in the
other forum prejudice other equitable considerations; or (5) adjudication of the same issue in
separate actions would result in delay, inconvenience, expense, inconsistency, or a race to judgment.
603 F. Supp. 636, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). A good example of the liberal analysis can be found in the district
court's opinion in Cbina Trade, No. 85 Civ. 8794 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 1987), largely reproduced in the dissenting
opinion of Judge Bright in the subsequent Second Circuit opinion, 837 F.2d 33, 38-39 (2d Cir. 1987) (Bright,
J., dissenting). See also Gau Shan.
10. 76 F.3d 624(Sth Cir.), reb, en banc, denied, 83 F.3d 421 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 4808
(Oct. 7, 1996). See Joseph P. Griffin, Judicial Decisions of US. Courts Not Invoking Arbitral Proceedings, 30 THE
INr'L LAw. 233, 236 (1996).
11. 76 F.3d at 627. ("We decline.., to genuflect before a vague and omnipotent notion of comity every
time that it must [be] decide[d] whether to enjoin a foreign action.") Procter and Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust
Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1353 (6th Cir. 1992).
12. The dissent by Judge Emilio Garza eloquently outlines the arguments against antisuit injunctions and in
favor of international comity and the approach of the Second, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits, providing a passionate
plea for comity:
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B. PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS ON THE OTHER SIDE
This year saw increased interest outside the United States in addressing the problem of
parallel proceedings, especially in connection with the potential for forum shopping. While
the problem is less significant within the European Union (EU) because of the availability of
a fis pendem under Article 21 of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions, the antisuit injunction
continues to thrive in the English courts. 1 Even within the EU, antisuit injunctions have created
some controversy, such as when a German court considered an English antisuit injunction
directed at German parties suing in a German court. The German court refused to permit
service of the English order, treating it as an infringement of German sovereignty by denying
the free access of citizens to German courts.' 4
English courts addressed the issue of antisuit injunctions in Airbus Industrie GIE v. Jaisukb
Arjun Bbai Patel and Otbers," a case which involved litigation in Bangalore, India, and in Texas
state and federal court as well. Unlike earlier antisuit injunction cases where England was one
of the potential forums, the court in Airbus considered the availability of antisuit injunctions
in cases where England was not the natural forum and the selection involved alternative forums,
here Texas and India, and where the parties sought to be restrained were within the jurisdiction
of the English courts. The case arose out of the crash of an Indian Airlines flight involving an
Airbus A320 in Bangalore, killing ninety-two persons and injuring the surviving passengers.
Four British citizens living in London were killed and four were injured. In addition, there
were three Americans who were also killed; none, however, were from Texas.
In February 1992, the English plaintiffs filed suit against the airline and airport company
in India, subsequently settling with the airline for the full amount of its limited liability. They
also continued their suit in India against the airport company, HAL, but without much prog-
ress. "These claimants also sued several parties in Texas, including Airbus Industrie, the manufac-
turer of the aircraft,'7 where recovery based on strict liability is available, unlike in India.'"
The Texas litigation involved challenges to jurisdiction, both subject matter and personal,
International comity represents a principle of paramount importance in our world of ever increasing
economic interdependence. Admitting that "comity" may be a somewhat elusive concept does
not mean that we can blithely ignore its cautionary dictate.. . .Amicable relations among sovereign
nations and their judicial systems depend on our recognition, as federal courts, that we share
the international arena with co-equal judicial bodies, and that we therefore act to deprive a foreign
court of jurisdiction only in the most extreme circumstances.
76 F.3d at 629 (Garza, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). See generally TErrz, supra note S.
13. Other countries following the English system have also adopted the antisuit injunction. See, e.g., Henry
v. Henry (1996) 135 ALR 564; National Mutual Holdings Pty. Ltd v. Sentry Corp. (1989) 87 ALR 539; Amchem
Products v. Workers Compensation Bd. (1993) 102 DLR (4th) 96. See also Keith Steele, Practitioners' Comment,
INTERNATIONAL LrrIGATION NEws, July 1996, 15-17.
14. Judgment ofJanuary 10, 1996, Oberlandesgerucht Dusseldorf, 1996 Zeitschrift fir Wirtschaftsrecht [ZIP]
294 (1996).
15. (C.A.) 31 July 1996 unreported (reproduced in THE TimS, August 12, 1996). The lower court opinion
is reproduced in THE TiMEs, May 21, 1996.
16. "The action of the English Claimants against HAL is continuing in India but does not appear to have
been pressed vigorously and has not made much progress." Airbus Industrie GIE v. Jaisukh Arjun Bhai Patel
and Others (THE TimEs 12 August 1996).
17. See Linton v. Airbus Indus., 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 4111 (Tex. App. 14th Dist. Sept. 12, 1996); see
also Linton v. Airbus Indus., 30 F.3d 592 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 639 (1994).
18. In addition, the Texas forum offered the potential for punitive damages and contingent fees unavailable
in India. The English Court of Appeals recognized that the English claimants would probably abandon their suit
if required to litigate in a jurisdiction without strict liability. Airbus Industrie, THE TI\sEs, August 12, 1996.
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although Airbus eventually agreed to personal jurisdiction. At the time that the English Court
of Appeals issued its antisuit injunction, the Texas trial court had dismissed the claims against
Airbus based on the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act. This decision, however, was pending
appeal and was reversed after the English appellate court rendered its decision."
In late 1992, Airbus initiated its own proceedings in India and in April 1995 obtained
permanent injunctive relief, restraining the English claimants from suing Airbus anywhere but
in Bangalore. This judgment, however, was not enforceable in England against the English
claimants who had not submitted to the jurisdiction of the Indian court in connection with
proceedings by or against Airbus, except in India.
Airbus subsequently filed in England for injunctive relief relating to the April 1995 Indian
judgment against the English claimants. The English High Court determined that it could
consider issuing an antisuit injunction even when the English court would not be the natural
forum for the litigation. Based on the facts, the court denied injunctive relief, finding that
Airbus had not decisively shown any injustice resulting from having to litigate in Texas. In this
determination, while the court acknowledged that India was the most appropriate forum for
litigation, it nevertheless weighed the vexatiousness to Airbus against the disadvantages to the
English claimants, primarily in loss of contingent fee possibilities and the delay in Indian courts.
The court specifically rejected the argument that the choice of Texas, where for a limited time
no forum non conveniens dismissal was possible, or the availability of no-fault liability and
higher damages, made the litigation "oppressive." ' '°
The Court of Appeals, while finding it appropriate to extend antisuit injunctions to situations
where the action being allowed to proceed was outside of England, found that indeed there
was indeed injustice as a result of the lack of availability of forum non conveniens. The court,
after determining that India was the appropriate forum, balanced the prejudice to Airbus against
the deprivation of "legitimate advantages" the English claimants would enjoy in litigating in
Texas. Texas was a rather "manifestly inappropriate forum," having no connection to the
parties or claims. Because the English claimants chose not to sue Airbus in India or alternatively
in France, another appropriate forum under the Brussels Convention, but rather to sue in a
"clearly inappropriate forum," the Court of Appeals described this conduct as "prima facie
oppressive."
Balanced against this oppression, the Court of Appeals determined that the application of
Texas strict liability law with the potential of punitive damages was an illegitimate juridical
advantage which also deprived Airbus of the potential for contribution from the other tortfeasors.
The court then looked to the "legitimate advantages," those not derived from suing in a
"manifestly inappropriate forum," such as avoiding delay in the court system and the ability
to finance the litigation. The contingent fee system, however, was viewed by the court as "part
and parcel of their [the English Claimants'] recourse to an inappropriate forum causing injustice
to Airbus Industrie and, consequently, it is itself an illegitimate advantage."'"
Of crucial significance to the ultimate decision appears to be the determination that Texas
was an inappropriate forum, but one where a dismissal based on forum non conveniens was
not available. Given the unusual facts of the case," it is not clear how likely an English court
19. Linton, 1996 Tex. App. Lexis 4111.
20. Airbus Industrie, THE TiMEs, May 21, 1996.
21. Id.
22. This also may refer to the unavailability at the time of forum non conveniens in Texas state courts.
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will be to grant an antisuit injunction to aid continuation of litigation in another forum, as
opposed to when England is the natural forum.
II. Sovereign Immunity and the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act*
Historically, foreign sovereigns possessed absolute immunity from suit in the courts of the
United States. This immunity was gradually softened as nations adopted the "restrictive" theory
of sovereign immunity, which recognizes a foreign sovereign's immunity only to the extent
its acts are public in nature. The U.S. State Department adopted this position in 1952 with
the Tate Letter, and in 1976 Congress codified the restrictive theory in the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA or Act).23
A. INTroDucrION
The FSIA transferred to the courts in all cases the determination of whether sovereign
immunity should be recognized, and set up a comprehensive and exclusive procedure to sue
foreign states and their agencies in U.S. courts. The Act recognizes basic principles of sovereign
immunity while establishing significant exceptions, some of which are discussed below. The
foreign sovereign, or its agency or instrumentality, is immune from suit in U.S. courts unless
specifically provided otherwise in the FSIA, subject to existing treaties and international
24agreements.
1. Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamabiriya,
No. 95-7930, 1996 WL 679020 (2d Cir. 1996)
In Smith, a class consisting of family members of all passengers and crew members killed in
the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988, and former Pan Am
employees, appealed from district court judgments dismissing their suits against defendants
(Libya) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.2" Plaintiffs alleged that the government of Libya,
acting through its agents, deliberately caused the bombing.
In affirming the lower court decision, the Second Circuit rejected the contention that when
Libya signed Article 25 of the United Nations Charter that binds all member nations to certain
decisions of the Security Council, and the Security Council then adopted Resolution 748 in
1992 which called on Libya to accept responsibility for the bombing, Libya committed itself
to pay compensation to Pan Am Flight 103 victims. The court held that the FSIA's displacement
of immunity for international agreements in effect at the time of the adoption of the FSIA
"does not contemplate a dynamic expansion whereby FSIA immunity can be removed by
action of the UN taken after the FSIA was enacted." 2 The court also found that this argument
would raise the "substantial constitutional" problem of whether Congress could delegate to
the U.N. the power to regulate U.S. court jurisdiction. Because Congress never explicitly
indicated that it was taking such a step, the court refused to imply it.
*John E. Davis is with the law firm of Miller & Chevalier in Washington, D.C.
23. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1994).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1604; House Report (1976) U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6616.
25. Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 886 F. Supp. 306 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), aftd,
No. 95-7930, 1996 WL 679020, *16 (2d Cir. November 26, 1996).
26. Id. at "16.
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2. El-Fadl v. Central Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
Here, the Second Circuit held that the chairman of the Jordanian central bank acting in his
official capacity was an "agency or instrumentality" of a foreign state, sharing the immunity
from suit for wrongful termination possessed by the Central Bank as a "foreign state" under
the FSIA.27 Where the only evidence on the record indicated that the officer fired the plaintiff
while acting for the Central Bank, the court found that the officer's position as chairman and
manager of a subsidiary of the bank only involved minor responsibilities compared to his major
duties as deputy governor of the Central Bank.28
3. Granville Gold Trust-Switzerland v. Commissione del Fullimento/lInter Cbange Bank,
924 F. Supp. 397 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)
The classification of an entity as an "agency or instrumentality" of a foreign state was also
discussed in Granville, where the court held that a commission created by the Swiss government
to supervise the liquidation of a private bank was a political subdivision or agency of Switzerland
and so a "foreign state" under the FSIA."9 The court interpreted "agency or instrumentality"
broadly, and viewed the governmental origin of the Commission as imbuing with a sovereign
nature its acts in furtherance of its mandate to administer the bankruptcy."0
4. Tannenbaum v. Rabin, No. CV-95-4357, 1996 WL 75283 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 1996)
The Eastern District of New York again confronted the "agency or instrumentality" issue
in this suit brought by a U.S. citizen against the Minister of Police of the State of Israel, an
unidentified Israeli policeman, and the estate of Yitzhak Rabin, the late Prime Minister of
Israel.i" A demonstration was staged while plaintiff was praying at the Western Wall in Jerusalem,
and when the police, acting at the discretion of Rabin and Shachal, decided to suppress the
demonstration an unidentified Israeli policeman attacked and injured the bystander-plaintiff.
Plaintiff alleged violations of rights to freedom of religion and freedom from harassment guaran-
teed by Israeli law and international law and treaties."
The court found that, even though the complaint named defendants in their individual as
well as official capacities, plaintiff alleged no acts committed directly by any defendant but the
unidentified officer, and only then "at the direction of" the other defendants.3" "In short,
[plaintiff]'s claim is against the defendants in their official roles only and therefore, as agencies




The court went on to take judicial notice that Rabin was, on the date in question, the
recognized head of state of Israel and dismiss the complaint against Rabin based on the immunity
of heads of state from suit in U.S. courts for acts in their official capacity, absent waiver or
27. EI-Fadl v. Central Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
28. Id.
29. Granville Gold Trust-Switzerland v. Commissione del Fullimento/lnter Change Bank, 924 F. Supp. 397,
404 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
30. Id. (discussing legislative history found in House Report (1976) U.S.C.CA.N. at 6613) suggesting broad
interpretation of term "agency or instrumentality").
31. Tannenbaum v. Rabin, No. CV-95-4357, 1996 WL 75283, *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 1996).
32. Id.
33. Id. at *3.
34. Id.
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statute." "In that capacity he enjoyed the immunity which the law confers and this court
could not exercise personal jurisdiction over him." 36
B. COMMERCIAL AcTrvrrY EXCEPTION
The most important exception to the rule of sovereign immunity is that found in FSIA
section 1605(a)(2) for commercial activity. In 1996, courts addressed the questions of(1) whether
an activity is "commercial" or public in nature, and (2) in a case involving an act outside of
the United States and in connection to a commercial activity outside of the United States,
whether that act causes a "direct effect" in the United States under the third dause of section
1605(a)(2).
1. Definition of "Commercial" Activity
In 1992 the Supreme Court in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., stated that an activity
is commercial "when a foreign government acts not as a regulator of a market, but in the
manner of a private player within it."" This inquiry focuses on the manner of the activity
and not the sovereign's purpose, i.e., whether the actions are the type by which a private party
engages in commerce.8
a. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Alhadhood, 82 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 1996)
The Fifth Circuit recently reaffirmed its pre-Weltover position that an activity has a commercial
"nature" for FSIA purposes if it "is of a type that a private person would customarily engage
in for profit."39 In Albadbood, MCI sought payment for unauthorized long-distance telephone
calls made by military personnel from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) training in the United
States. The court held that these calls and promises supposedly made by UAE representatives
to pay for these calls were not commercial activity.
Although recognizing that private parties as well as foreign states can negotiate to settle
disputes, the court found that the alleged promises were made through diplomatic channels and
so were uniquely sovereign activities.4 MCI was not seeking a contract through its diplomatic
entreaties, but to cover its losses from a third-party's actions. Therefore, the court found no
sufficient nexus between defendants and MCI to classify the alleged promises as commercial
activity.4'
Furthermore, and despite the consensus that contracts for goods and services are generally
considered commercial rather than governmental in nature, the court found that a military
training agreement between the UAE and the United States where the UAE guaranteed any
debts incurred by its training personnel did not constitute commercial activity by a foreign
state. The court rejected MCI's argument that the contract made MCI a third-party beneficiary,
stating that the agreement was between two sovereigns and did not require the purchase of
35. Id. at *5.
36. Id. at *5 (citing to Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 131-32 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)).
37. 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992).
38. Id.
39. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Alhadhood, 82 F.3d 658, 663 (5th Cir.) (quoting Callejo v. Bancomer,
S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1108 n.6 (Sth Cir. 1985)),petition for cert. filed, No. 96-434, 65 U.S.L.W. 3205 (Sep. 17,
1996).
40. Albadbood, 82 F.3d at 663.
41. Id.
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any goods or services from MCI. Therefore, there was "nothing in the nature of this agreement
... that would constitute commercial activity.',
4
1
b. Granville Gold Trust-Switzerland v. Commissione del Fullimento/Inter Change Bank,
924 F. Supp. 397 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)
Here, the Commissione was sued for conversion from actions related to its role in gathering
assets and adjudicating claims.4" The court held that, just as a trustee in bankruptcy is not a
successor-in-interest to a debtor, so, too, the Commissione was not a successor-in-interest to
the bank, and therefore the Commissione's activities need not possess the same commercial
character.' The court held that the activities in question-the court authorized liquidation of
the bank-could not be performed by a private citizen and so were sovereign in nature. 4
2. Direct Effect in the United States
This most frequently invoked component of the commercial activity exception has also
received the most interpretation by the courts. The Supreme Court stated in Weltover that an
effect is direct if it follows as an immediate consequence of the defendant's activity.4' With
this, the Court expressly rejected foreseeability as an element of the direct effects test. 47 Courts
have continued to grapple with this ruling in 1996.
a. Aldy v. Valmet Paper Machinery, 74 F.3d 72 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 68 (1996)
In Aldy, the Fifth Circuit held that products liability actions against the foreign manufacturer
of a paper making machine were based on the commercial activities of a foreign sovereign and
so not immune from suit under the FSIA.48 The legal representatives of victims of a paper
mill accident brought suit alleging wrongful death, failure to warn, and design and manufacturing
defects in a machine designed and manufactured in Finland and installed in Louisiana. The
court characterized these as "classic design and manufacturing defect suits, which the third
clause of the commercial activities exception is broad enough to cover."49
Valmet, a company controlled by the Finnish government, asserted immunity from suit
under the FSIA and moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit
upheld the Magistrate's ruling denying the motion based on the commercial activities exception,
finding that Valmet manufactured the machines in Finland, and the alleged defects and negligence
directly caused the injuries complained of.'5 The Magistrate also held that plaintiffs need not
42. Id. at 664. A strong dissent to the majority's finding that the negotiations and alleged promises made
by the UAE were not commercial activities under the FSIA was registered by Judge Garza. Id (Garza, CJ.,
dissenting). Judge Garza believed that the unauthorized nature of the calls and the existence of a military training
agreement with the U.S. were irrelevant to the nature of UAE's actions in allegedly agreeing to pay for the calls.
These alleged promises would be a contract for services that any private person could enter into, and so commercial
in nature. Id. at 666.
43. See supra note 29.
44. Id. at 408.
45. Id. at 407.
46. 504 U.S. at 618; see supra note 37 and accompanying text.
47. McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 52 F.3d 346, 350-51 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 704 (1996).
48. Aldy v. Valmet Paper Machinery, 74 F.3d 72 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 68 (1996).
49. Id. at 73, 75.
50. Id. at 74.
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allege specific defects to establish subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA; any factual short-
comings would be addressed at the summary judgment phase.
The court found that the causal nexus between the commercial activities and the deaths was
"direct" because it followed "as an immediate consequence of the defendant's activity.""' Valmet
did not deny that it designed and manufactured the machines in Finland, or that these machines
caused the deaths, and plaintiffs maintained that the injuries were an immediate consequence
of Valmet's negligent design and manufacturing-allegations sufficient to confer subject matter
jurisdiction under the FSIA." The court further held that the commercial exception covered "fail-
ure to warn" cases because an omission is an act and plaintiffs suit was based on these commercial
acts that allegedly occurred outside of but directly affecting the United States."'
b. Granville Gold Trust-Switzerland v. Commissione del Fullimento/Inter Change Bank,
924 F. Supp. 397 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)
The court here found that, even if the activities of the Commissione in winding-up the
affairs of the bankrupt bank were commercial, there still was no direct effect in the United
States to establish jurisdiction. s4 The court held that economic loss alone by American citizens
is not enough to establish a "direct effect" in the United States." The funds were not in this
country and so no loss due to the alleged mismanagement was suffered here.
C. TORT ExCEPrION
In those cases not falling within the commercial exception to sovereign immunity, plaintiff
can still bring suit under the FSIA if: (1) money damages are sought for (2) personal injury,
death, or damage or loss of property (3) caused by a tortious act or omission in the United
States (4) by a foreign state or official or employee of that state while acting within the scope
of his office or employment (except regarding his discretionary functions).56
1. Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamabiriya, No. 95-7930, 1996 WL
679020 (2d Cir. 1996)
In Smith the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court judgment dismissing a suit attempting
to hold Libya responsible in tort under FSIA section 1605(a)(5) for the Pan Am bombing,
because the alleged act occurred outside of United States territory." The appellate court sum-
marily dismissed plaintiff's argument that, because the bombing occurred in an American
aircraft, it should be considered American territory. The court refused to extend to aircraft
the traditional classification given to nautical vessels flying an American flag as "American
territory," noting that such treatment has not even been given to torts committed by foreign
states in U.S. embassies."' The court concluded that "the fact that a location is subject to an
assertion of United States authority does not necessarily mean that it is the 'territory' of the
United States for purposes of the FSIA." 9
51. Id. at 75 (quoting Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 76; accord Brown v. Valmet-Appelton, 77 F.3d 860 (5th Cir. 1996) (same facts; company seventy
percent owned by Finnish Government).
54. See supra notes 29 and 43.
55. Id.
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(aX5).
57. See supra note 25, at "14.
58. Smitb, 1996 WL 679020, *15.
59. Id.
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2. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Albadbood, 82 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 1996)
The Fifth Circuit in Albadbood ruled that military trainees of the United Arab Emirates that
made unauthorized long-distance telephone calls in the United States were not acting within
the scope of their employment with the UAE, and so did not satisfy the tortious activity
exception to the FSIA. 60 The unauthorized calls apparently had nothing to do with the military
training mission, and so could not be attributed to the employer.
3. Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimab, 921 F. Supp. 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
The Cabiri court applied the tort exception to hold that a Ghanaian security official did not
enjoy sovereign immunity for alleged acts of torture in a daim brought under the Torture
Victim Protection Act of 1991. Although the FSIA provides immunity for acts carried out
by foreign officials sued in their official capacity, it does not shield the commission of acts such
as torture which exceed the lawful boundaries of the official's authority.62 Therefore, "the
FSIA does not apply to this action" and the court found subject matter jurisdiction to exist
under the Alien Tort Claims Act.6"
4. Tannenbaum v. Rabin, No. CV-95-4357, 1996 WL 75283 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)
In Tannenbaum, the court dismissed with only perfunctory analysis a claim against the
Minister of Police of Israel alleging that officers under his command brutalized the plaintiff
when he was caught up in a demonstration in Jerusalem. 4 The court simply noted that Shachal
was acting in his official capacity at all times pertinent to the action and so the tortious act
or omission exception to sovereign immunity did not apply. In contrast to the court in Nassim,
infra, here Judge Glasser does not even consider whether alleged indiscriminate acts of police
brutality could exceed the discretionary functions of this official actor.65
5. Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim, 1996 WL 665227 (D.D.C. 1996)
In Nassim, the court confronted whether assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress by an employee of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) was immune
from suit under the FSIA."6 Noting that the tortious activity exception is "essentially a respondeat
60. See supra note 39.
61. Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991,
28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (1994).
62. Id. at 1197, 1198.
63. Id. at 1198; Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
64. See supra note 37.
65. The court also denied jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1350, which provides that "[tihe district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States." Id. at *5. Not only did the court reject this argument out of hand
for not citing to a particular international law or treaty and without even considering whether the violation of
religious rights alleged in the complaint might qualify as a violation of the law of nations, but Judge Glasser labels
the assertion of jurisdiction under this statute as "vexatious" and scheduled a Rule II hearing to show cause
why attorney for plaintiff should not be sanctioned. Id. at *6.
66. Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim, Civ. A. No. 95-01855 CRR, 1996. WL 665227 (D.D.C. March 18, 1996).
Mr. Nassim claimed immunity under the International Organizations Privileges and Immunities Act, which provides
that international organizations such as the IFC enjoy the same immunity as enjoyed by a foreign government.
28 U.S.C. § 288a(b). This same immunity is extended to officers and employees of such organizations relating
to acts performed by them in their official capacity and falling within their official functions, except insofar as
such immunity may be waived by the organization concerned. 22 U.S.C. § 288d(b).
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superior statute," the court held that the alleged torts were not committed within the scope
of plaintiffs employment.67
Mr. Nassim's alleged assaults and batteries can in no way be considered to have furthered the
IFC's interests, nor could the IFC have reasonably foreseen that his actions might have occurred
as a natural result of his employment.6"
Therefore, the court found that Mr. Nassim could not claim immunity and the IFC did not
waive immunity under the tort exception.
The court did find that the defendant was acting in his official duties in one incident when
he allegedly grabbed plaintiff to protect files from trespass and theft.' 9 The harsh manner of
his actions (he allegedly grabbed plaintiffs wrists and twisted them behind her back, and kicked
her shin), however, took them out of the "discretionary function" exception to tortious acts.
These were not decisions grounded in social, economic, or political policy and so not exempted
from suit under the FSIA.°
D. WAIVER EXCEPTION
A foreign sovereign is not immune from U.S. jurisdiction when it explicitly or implicitly
waives its immunity, such as when it has agreed to arbitrate or that the law of a particular
country should govern a contract, or when a foreign sovereign files a responsive pleading in
an action without raising the sovereign immunity defense. 7'
I. Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamabiriya, No. 95-7930, 1996 WL
679020 (2d Cir. 1996)
In Smitb, the Second Circuit discussed implied waiver in the context of a foreign state's responsi-
bility for terrorist acts allegedly committed on its behalf and at its instance. 2 Here the appellate
court held that the FSIA, prior to the recent amendment," does not subject foreign sovereigns
to U.S. court jurisdiction for violations of fundamental international norms (ius cogens) on the
theory of waiver of sovereign immunity4.7 The court addressed two separate arguments made by
plaintiffs supporting the proposition that Libya implicitly waived immunity for the bombing.'
First, the court rejected the assertion that Congress intended violations of fundamental norms
of international law to implicitly waive sovereign immunity under section 1605(a)(1) of the
FSIA. The argument flows from the notion that:
67. Id. at *4-5.
68. Id. at "5.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. House Report (1976) U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6616-17.
72. See supra notes 25 and 26.
73. See infra section I.E (discussing recent amendment to FSIA permitting in some circumstances suit against
foreign sovereigns for infractions of fundamental international norms such as international terrorism).
74. Smith, 1996 WL 679020, *5-12. The court had previously ruled that such violations ofjus cogens can
be redressed by civil suit in U.S. courts against private citizens. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
75. Smith, 1996 WL 679020, *5. The Smith court also refused to accept the emotional argument that
Congress simply could not have intended to shield such horrific acts as the bombing of a passenger aircraft from
legal redress by referencing the recent amendment to the FSIA removing the sovereign immunity of foreign states
as a defense to acts of international terrorism. See infra section I.E. The court characterizes the amendment as
a "carefully crafted provision that abolishes the defense only in precisely defined circumstances," and took the
narrow scope of the amendment as evidence that Congress is capable of subjecting some acts of international
terrorism to suit without removing the defense for all violations ofjus cogens by foreign states. Smith, 1996 WL
679020, 10.
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[Blecause observance of jus cogens is so universally recognized as vital to the functioning of a
community of nations, every nation impliedly waives its traditional sovereign immunity for viola-
tions of such fundamental standards by the very act of holding itself out as state. 6
The Smitb court recognized that Congress was by no means unambiguous in the text of
section 1605(a)(1) as to the meaningof an implicit waiver," and discussed three possible meanings
of the term: (1) the actor could have intended to waive immunity without expressly saying
so (subjective intentionality); (2) a reasonable observer could have interpreted the actions as
intentionally waiving immunity (objective intentionality); and (3) the law deems the actor to
have surrendered immunity regardless of his subjective or objective intent (forfeiture). 8
While refusing to decide which was intended, the court found that Congress at least did
not intend that meaning attributed to it by plaintiffs. The court noted that Congress illustrated
implied waiver "with examples drawn entirely from the context of conduct related to the
litigation process," and grounded its holding on this "persuasive evidence that Congress primarily
expected courts to hold a foreign state to an implied waiver of sovereign immunity by the state's
actions in relation to the conduct of litigation." 79 While recognizing that other circumstances may
exist where implied waiver would be found, "[n]evertheless, [the examples] indicate the principal
context that Congress had in mind ... and, at a minimum, they preclude a sweeping implied
waiver for all violations of jus cogens. 0
Finally, the Smitb court rejected the argument that Libya waived immunity from suit when,
in a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations, an official in the Libyan government
wrote that "Libya guarantees the payment of any compensation that might be incurred by
the responsibility of the two suspects who are its nationals . .."" The court held that the
letter was not sufficiently related to the litigation process because it contained no express or
indirect reference to waiver of immunity to subject Libya to U.S. jurisdiction. Construing the
waiver provisions narrowly, the court stated that "[a] generalized undertaking to pay the debt
of a national ... does not imply that the guaranteeing state agrees to be sued on such an
undertaking in a United States court.""
2. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Albadhood, 82 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 1996)
The Fifth Circuit in Albadhood found that entry of a default judgment prior to defendant's
claim of sovereign immunity under the FSIA does not waive its right to claim immunity or
challenge the default judgment on the same ground.83 Here, defendants failed to file a responsive
pleading prior to entry of default judgments, and then asserted their claim of sovereign immunity
in a collateral proceeding through a motion to vacate the default judgments.84
76. Id. at *6 (citing to Adam C. Belsky et al., Implied Waiver Under the FSIA: A Proposed Exception to Immunity
for Violations of Peremptory Norms of International Law, 77 CAL. L. Rav. 365 (1989)).
77. The section reads simply that "a foreign state shall not be immune ... in any case in which the foreign
state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication." 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1).
78. Smith, 1996 WL 679020, 7.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 11.
81. Id. at 13.
82. Id. at 14.
83. See supra notes 39 and 40.
84. Albadbood, 82 F.3d 658.
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The court held that a default judgment predicated on the sovereign's failure to appear is
not a "responsive pleading" and so waiver cannot be implied. Furthermore, such waiver would
conflict with FSIA section 1608(e), which requires a court to satisfy itself that jurisdiction
exists prior to entering a default judgement.8"
E. Jus COGENs ExcEPTION
In 1996, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 221(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1241 (1996) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(7)), which amended the FSIA to permit suits against foreign states in some circum-
stances for acts in violation of fundamental international norms.
The amendment provides that a suit for money damages may be brought against a foreign
state that has been officially designated as a state sponsor of terrorism86 for cases where personal
injury or death was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, or hostage
taking, or the funding of such acts. The amendment only applies to cases not otherwise covered
by the commercial activities exception found in FSIA section 1605(a)(2), and the acts or funding
must have been carried out by an agent, official, or employee of the foreign state in the course
of his official duties.87 The court cannot maintain jurisdiction even if the state was so designated
as a terrorist state if the act occurred in the foreign state and no "reasonable" opportunity has
been afforded the state to arbitrate the claim, or if the claimant was not a national of the
United States at the time of the act.88 The amendment was expressly made to apply retroactively
to "any cause of action arising before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act.' 89
III. Forum Selection and Forum Non Conveniens*
The advantage gained by selecting the preferred forum has led to extensive litigation in 1996
over the enforceability of forum selection clauses in contracts or consents to jurisdiction,° and the
fairness of the selection of forum to the opposing party or witnesses.9' While the enforceability of
selection clauses is generally a matter of contract law, the doctrine of forum non conveniens
gives a court discretion to refuse to exercise jurisdiction even if venue is proper if the balance
of conveniences is heavily weighted in favor of an alternative forum.9"
85. Id. at 662 ("By deferring its jurisdictional challenge, the foreign state only loses its right to defend on
the merits"); Id. (citing Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
706 (1982)).
86. This designation must have been made prior to or as a result of the act complained of, under the procedure
provided by § 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. § 2405(Q) or § 620A of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. § 2371). Pub. L. No. 104-132 § 221(a)(IXC), 110 Stat. 1214, 1241
(to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1607(a)).
87. Id. (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1607).
88. Id. (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1607(aXi)-(ii)).
89. Note to 28 U.S.C. § 1605, 110 Star. 1214, 1243.
*Whitney Debevoise, Vice-Chair of the International Litigation Committee, is a member of the firm Arnold
& Porter in Washington, D.C.
90. Unless enforcement of the dause "would be unreasonable and unjust" or the clause is a result of "fraud
or overreaching," forum selection clauses will be upheld in federal court. Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407
U.S. 1, 15 (1972).
91. See generally, NANDA & PA.asts, LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DIsPTEms IN U.S. CourTs, ch. 4 (1986
and 1996 Supp.).
92. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947) (setting out factors, public and private, where
a court may exercise its discretion to dismiss a case where an alternative forum has jurisdiction).
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A. FEDERAL COURT CASES
1. Peregrine Myanmar Ltd. v. Sega193
In Peregrine Myanmar Ltd. v. Segal, the Second Circuit affirmed the enforceability of a forum
selection clause between two companies based in Myanmar (formerly Burma). The companies
had operations in Myanmar and Hong Kong, and sued a former officer and director of both
companies who lived in the selected forum, New York.94 The suit named Miriam Segal as the
defendant, alleging breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, unfair competition, and tortious
interference with prospective economic advantage.
Under a share acquisition agreement, the plaintiffs had agreed to buy the subsidiary of the
defendant's holding company and give the defendant a three-year employment contract as
Executive Chairman to a new company. The defendant allegedly schemed to create losses for
the new company to induce its sale, at an artificially low price, to Mitsui, ajapanese company.
The defendant then apparently outlined this scheme in a memorandum which she intended
to fax to Mitsui's Hong Kong office, but which she mistakenly faxed to the Hong Kong office
of the plaintiffs' parent company. The defendant argued for dismissal of the case because,
among other reasons, he believed Hong Kong to be a superior forum to New York since the
New York forum would require some witnesses to engage in transoceanic travel."5
In affirming the District Court's dismissal of the defendant's motion, the Second Circuit
concluded that while Hong Kong would have jurisdiction of the case, the District Court properly
exercised its discretion.96 More precisely, the District Court appropriately applied three of the
factors outlined in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert in determining that New York was the proper
forum: (1) relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) cost of obtaining attendance of willing
witnesses; and (3) the enforceability of judgments.97 The defendant failed to meet the burden
of overcoming the presumption in favor of the plaintiffs' choice of forum because Segal lived
in the selected forum. Moreover, she only identified one witness who lives in Hong Kong,
and the plaintiffs were willing to pay for the witness's travel expenses.
2. loannides v. Marika Maritime Corp.9
8
In this case, the Court dismissed a suit on the ground of forum non conveniens by the
plaintiffs, five Greek nationals, against Marika Maritime Corp., a Liberian corporation, which
owned the vessel in which crew members of the vessel who were the plaintiffs' relatives died. 99
Alleging that the defendant's vessel was owned and controlled from the New York area by
Peter Pappas, a Connecticut resident, the plaintiffs brought this suit in New York, seeking to
recover under the Death on the High Seas Act.'0° The plaintiffs argued that Pappas was an
unscrupulous operator who negligently failed to keep the vessel in good repair and who was
hiding behind the shield of a collective bargaining agreement which prohibited recourse to
courts of countries other than Greece. 10 1
93. 89 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1996)
94. Id.
95. Id. at 47.
96. Id. at 44.
97. 330 U.S. at 508.
98. 928 F. Supp. 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
99. See Id. at 380.
100. See 46 App. U.S.C. § 761 (1995).
101. Ioannides, 928 F. Supp. at 376.
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The Court concluded that while this was a maritime case falling under the Jones Act, the
principles articulated in GulfOil Co. v. Gilbert'" still controlled the forum non conveniens issue.
In applying these principles, the Court ruled that an alternative forum, Greece, existed that
was preferable notwithstanding the presumption in favor of the plaintiffs' choice of forum.
The Court focused on two facts: all of the witnesses in the case were in Greece, and U.S.
courts do not usually give much weight to forum preferences of aliens.'0'
B. STATE COURTS
A majority of state courts are also empowered by statute to dismiss suits subject to their
jurisdiction on forum non conveniens grounds, although the laws vary from state to state.' °4
New York, for example, limits dismissal in commercial cases when the contract is governed
by New York law and provides for jurisdiction in New York courts. New York courts do
not, however, require an alternative forum to be available in order to dismiss, although this
can be a factor in the analysis.'
The law in Texas in particular has changed over the last several years after the Texas Supreme
Court held that the forum non conveniens doctrine had been abolished in certain tort suits
in state court.'0 6 This ruling prompted the Texas state legislature to reinstate a limited form
of forum non conveniens for cases filed on or after September 1993."'
IV. Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law*
The American judiciary's approach to the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws, particularly
in the areas of antitrust and securities, has significant implications for the future functioning
of global trade and the development of cooperative international competition law regulation.
A narrow interpretation of the Supreme Court decision in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California""5
would severely damage international trade relations. However, recent case law raises the possibil-
ity of a return to a more flexible attitude that recognizes both foreign state sovereignty and
the importance of international cooperation.
102. 330 U.S. at 508.
103. loannides, 928 F. Supp. at 378.
104. See generally TErrz, TRANSNATIONAL LrriGATiON, §§ 3-5 (discussing the forum non conveniens doctrine
in various states).
105. See IFS Int'l Inc. v. SLM Software Inc., 638 N.Y.S.2d 186 (App. Div., 1996) (upholding dismissal on
forum non conveniens grounds; court found it especially significant that the contract at issue called for the
application of Canadian law and pendency of a similar action commenced by the defendant in Canada, ensuring
no undue prejudice to the plaintiff by dismissal because an alternative forum available); see also Brooke Group
Ltd. v. JCH Syndicate 488, 663 N.E.2d 635, (N.Y. App. 1996) (service of suit clause in contract was permissive
in nature, so that forum non conveniens dismissal was not precluded); World Point Trading Pte, Ltd. v. Credito
Italiano, 649 N.Y.S.2d 689, 692 (N.Y. App. Div., 1st. Dept. 1996) (dismissed pursuant to C.P.L.R. 327[a]
because nexus between disputes and states was insufficient to render the forum convenient since some parties
resided overseas, a concurrent action was pending in Italy, and to ease the burden on state court of the multiplicity
of the action).
106. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1024 (1991).
107. Tax. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051; see TErrz, supra note 104, at §§ 3-5 n. 129-32 (reproducing
the statute and discussing the change in law).
*Richard Diwan practices with the firm of Debevoise & Plimpton in New York City.
108. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
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A. INTRODUCTION
Federal courts have traditionally applied a balancing test to extraterritoriality cases, concluding
that American antitrust laws only apply to conduct occurring outside of the United States
where: (1) the challenged conduct had or was intended to have an effect on American foreign
commerce; (2) that effect was substantial; and (3) the magnitude of the effect on American
foreign commerce was sufficiently strong vis-i-vis the interests of other nations to justify an
assertion of extraterritorial authority.'" The Supreme Court introduced uncertainty into the
field when it avoided use of the balancing test in Hartford Fire Insurance."' Here the majority
of the Court, led by Justice Souter, held that the critical question was whether there was a
true conflict between domestic and foreign law, and that no such conflict existed where a
person, subject to regulation by two states, could comply with the laws of both. " ' Regarding
international comity, Justice Souter simply noted that since no true conflict existed, "[w]e [the
justices] have no need ... to address other considerations that might inform a decision to
refrain from the exercise of jurisdiction on the grounds of international comity....
The majority decision in Hartford Fire Insurance unwisely devalues the importance of comity
considerations by equating a conflict in the interests of two nations with "foreign compulsion,"
thereby extending the scope of the American antitrust laws into areas in which the legitimate
interests of foreign countries are substantially greater."' Even nations with highly developed
financial regulatory regimes may use different mechanisms to control types of market behavior
and this might not involve legal prohibition of the activity in question. A narrow interpretation
of Hartford Fire Insurance would mean that American courts are not required to take account
of the strong interests of a foreign country simply because that country opts to regulate certain
activities by means other than legal prohibition. This approach violates public international
law and the principle of territorial sovereignty that it upholds, and would be extremely damaging
to international trade relations.
B. IN RE MAXWELL COMMUNICATION CORP. PLC By HOMAN
United States Court decisions following the demise of Robert Maxwell and the collapse of
his media enterprise, Maxwell Communications, demonstrate the weakness of the "dear conflict
test" and suggest a return to a more conventional balancing of interests analysis. In re Maxwell
Communication Corp. pie by Homan "' was set against the complex background of a plan to
109. E.g., Timbertane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. and S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 611-612 (9th Cir.
1976). This third factor, commonly referred to as the "balancing test," was first expounded by Justice Choy in
Timberlane Lumber Co. and involved the application of a number of factors that have since been adopted in slighdy
modified form by subsequent case law, e.g., In re Insurance Antitrust Litigation, 938 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1991);
O.N.E. Shipping Ltd. v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 830 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1987); Mannington Mills,
Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979), and the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 402, 403 [hereinafter REsTATEMENT].
110. 509 U.S. at 798.
111. Id. Because English law did not require the London reinsurers to violate U.S. law, no conflict existed.
112. Id. at 799. The minority of the Supreme Court, led by Justice Scalia, was appalled by such a "breathtakingly
broad proposition, which contradicts ... [precedent and] will bring the Sherman Act and other laws into sharp
and unnecessary conflict with the legitimate interests of other countries-particulary our closest trading partners."
Id. at 820 (emphasis added) (ScaliaJ., dissenting). InsteadJustice Scalia advocated the application of the balancing
factors set out in the Restatement to determine the extraterritorial reach of U.S. statutes.
113. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Confli, Balancing of Interests, and the Exercise of Juri diction to Prescribe. Refleaiom
on the Insurance Antitrust Case, 89 AJ.I. 42, 45 (1995).
114. 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996).
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reorganize the bankrupt Maxwell Communications and distribute its assets to its many creditors.
In a "remarkable sequence of events leading to perhaps the first world-wide plan of orderly
liquidation ever achieved," the English and American courts involved coordinated their supervi-
sion of the case and appointed administrators and examiners that worked together to produce
a common plan for reorganizing Maxwell Communications and distributing the proceeds to
its creditors."' The plan, filed by the administrators in both nations' courts, was binding on
all creditors.
The issue arising in In re Maxwell Communication was whether Maxwell Communications
could recover millions of dollars it had transferred to three foreign banks, Bardays Bank plc
(London), National Westminster Bank plc (London), and Socit6 General (Paris), shortly before
filing a petition for reorganization, pursuant to the avoidance laws of the United States Bank-
ruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-13 30 (1994). The negotiations relating to the transfers and
the transfers themselves had all taken place in London.
In parallel insolvency proceedings in England, Barclays Bank had previously and unsuccessfully
sought to obtain an ex parte order barring the American proceedings because of a difference
in the American and English laws on avoidance of pre-petition transfers of property to creditors.
English law, unlike American law, imposes an additional condition on the application of its
avoidance laws-a subjective intent requirement that the debtor intended to put the transferee
in a better position. After this failure to bar the American proceedings, Barclays Bank filed a
FRCP 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, arguing that international comity and the presumption against
the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws warranted dismissal of the case. The bankruptcy
court granted the motion on both grounds and the Second Circuit affirmed on grounds of
international comity.
Departing from the order and method of analysis used by Justice Souter in Hartford Fire
Insurance, the Second Circuit did not first address the question whether there was a true conflict
between American and English law, but instead concentrated on the importance of applying
principles of international comity in determining whether to apply the American Bankruptcy
Code to conduct occurring abroad. Judge Cardamone, writing for the Second Circuit, instead
elicited the factors set forth in section 403 of the Restatement, emphasizing that "[t]he analysis
must consider the international system as a whole in addition to the interests of individual
states because the effective functioning of that system is to the advantage of all the affected
jurisdictions."...
The Second Circuit concluded that England had a much closer connection to the dispute
than the United States." 7 Not only were the debtor and most of its creditors British and all
of the transfers negotiated and conducted in London, but Maxwell Communications was
incorporated under the laws of England, largely controlled by British nationals, and managed
in London by British executives. Furthermore, the only connection between the transfers to
the three banks and the United States was the fact that some of the money in the transfers
to Soci&t Generale came from the sale of Maxwell subsidiaries in the United States, a connection
far outweighed by the English interests. Judge Cardamone was especially motivated by what
115. Id. at 1042, quoting Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Lessons ofMaxwdll CommuniatiMo, 64 FORDHAM L.
Rav. 2531, 2535 (1996).
116. 93 F.3d at 1048.
117. Id. at 1051.
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he termed a "systemic interest" in preserving and furthering the "high level of international
cooperation and a significant degree of harmonization of the laws of the two countries....
Having first completed this comity analysis, Judge Cardamone then addressed the plaintiffs'
argument that, under Hartford Fire Insurance, the use of comity was improper because English
law did not require anything that violated American law. A strict interpretation of Hartford
Fire Insurance would have suggested that no true conflict existed since English law did not
mandate the distribution of the debtor's assets in a particular way, but simply prescribed rules
by which the assets should be distributed if that debtor chose to petition the court for avoidance
of the transfers. Recognizing that such a literal interpretation would completely undermine the
purpose of the English law rule, Judge Cardamone found that a conflict did exist because it
was not possible to distribute the debtor's assets in a manner consistent with the English and
American rules. Equally importantly, Judge Cardamone took advantage of Justice Souter's
advocacy in Hartford Fire Insurance of the use of international comity in the event of a true
conflict to justify his prior use of an international comity analysis.'"
9
Judge Cardamone's approach thus restores common sense to an area that has been in a state
of confusion since Hartford Fire Insurance. Only a system of international judicial cooperation
can efficiently resolve the issues raised by transactions affecting the markets of several different
countries. Hopefully, such judicial cooperation is simply a first stage towards establishing a set
of international principles on competition law regulation. 2' Ultimately, what is required is the
convergence of competition rules within the framework of an organization, such as the World
Trade Organization, capable of enforcing those rules.' There are some draft proposals for
the convergence of competition rules, such as The Draft International Antitrust Code prepared
by a group called the International Antitrust Code Working Group.' However, no such
proposal can be taken seriously if the U.S. courts do not first take the lead in adopting a
cooperative approach to the extraterritorial application of its competition laws as exemplified
in In re Maxwell Communication.
V. Discovery*
A. INTRODUCTION
American procedure regarding international discovery stems from 28 U.S.C. §§ 1781-83,
and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP or Rule) 28(b). Broadly speaking, these rules are
concerned with the mechanics of assessing requests for discovery in the United States to assist
a proceeding in a foreign country and attempts by one or more parties before a U.S. court
to obtain evidence located in another country.
118. Id. at 1053.
119. Id. at 1050.
120. AsJudge Cardamone recognized: "[C]omity analysis admittedly does not yield the commercial predictabil-
ity that might eventually be achieved through uniform rules, it permits the courts to reach workable solutions
and to overcome some of the problems of a disordered international system." Id. at 1053.
121. See Mitsuo Matsushita, Cultural Concaption f Competition: Competition Law and Poli&y in the Context of
the WTO System, 44 DEPAUL L. REv. 1097 (1995) (advocating formulation of a set of principles for competition
policy into a code under auspices of WTO, at least in areas exhibiting strong need for convergence).
122. 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1628, S-20, 259 (Special Supp. August 19, 1993).
*Christopher Borgen is with the law firm Debevoise & Plimpton in New York City.
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B. DISCOVERAB[LITY IN FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS
Regarding assistance to foreigners seeking discovery in the United States, the Circuits are
split as to whether material sought through section 1782 must be "discoverable" in the country
in which the underlying proceeding is taking place.' 23 Numerous courts have addressed this
question in the last year.
1. In re Letter of Request from the Amtsgericbt Ingolstadt, Federal Republic of Germany'24
(United States v. Morris)
The Fourth Circuit touched briefly upon the issue of discoverability in In re Letter of Request
from theAmtsgericbtlngolstadt, FederalRepublic of Germany. 2 Regarding a request for assistance in
obtaining a blood sample in connection with a paternity suit, the Court stated that discoverability
concerns are not implicated when the request comes from a foreign court since that court is
the arbiter of what is discoverable under its own rules.' 26
2. In re Application of Alvaro Noboa'"
The Second Circuit, in contrast with other circuits, has held that "section 1782 does not
impose the requirement that the material sought in the United States be discoverable under
the laws of the foreign jurisdiction." '' In In re Application ofAlvaro Noboa, a district court in
the Southern District of New York stayed discovery requests arising out of a foreign action.' 2'
The court based its ruling on logistical concerns such as the imminent addition of new parties
and the risk of duplication of depositions. However, the court explicitly stated that absent
dear guidance from the foreign jurisdiction, it would not be concerned with whether such
discovery would be allowable under that jurisdiction's rules.
3. In re Application of Mats Wilander and Karel Novacek" °
Based on dicta in Third Circuit opinions and the "weight of authority from other courts
of appeals," a district court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania conduded, in In re Application
of Mats Wilander and Karel Novacek, that "the Third Circuit would likely find a discoverability
requirement inherent in § 1782.....
4. In re Honda American Motor Co, Inc. Dealersbip Relations Litigation
1 2
In In re Honda American Motor Co, Inc. Dealership Relations Litigation,"' a court of the
District of Maryland addressed the issue of whether compelling the deposition in the United
123. See In re Application of Mats Wilander and Karel Novacek, No. 96 Misc. 98, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10357, n.4 (E.D. Pa. July 24, 1996).
124. 82 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1996).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 592.
127. No. 3:96MC34 (JBA), 1996 WL 648885 (D. Conn. Oct. 23, 1996).
128. Id. at *4 citing In re Application of Aldunate, 3 F.3d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 1993). The Second Circuit has
distilled § 1782 into the following basic requirements: (1) that the person from whom discovery is sought resides
in (or is found) in the district of the district court to which the application is made; (2) that the discovery be for
use in a proceeding before a foreign tribunal; and (3) that the application be made by a foreign or international
tribunal or any interested person. See, e.g., In re Esses, infra note 145.
129. Misc. Nos. M18-302, M19-111, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14402 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 1995).
130. 168 F.R.D. 535 (D. Md. 1996).
131. Id. at *11.
132. No. 96 Misc. 98, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10357 (E.D. Pa. July 24, 1996).
133. Id.
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States of the citizens of a foreign nation, in this case Japan, could be considered an infringement
of that nation's sovereignty. The court reasoned that discovery requests only implicate foreign
sovereignty in certain contexts, such as compelling discovery on foreign soil, but that compelling
discovery on foreign nationals on American or neutral soil does not raise issues of comity." 4
Consequently, a full comity analysis was unnecessary and depositions could proceed.
5. Elm Energy and Recycling (UK.) Ltd. v. John Basic Sr.135
A district court in the Eastern District of Illinois stated in Elm Energy and Recycling (U.K.)
Ltd. v. Jobn Basic Sr. ,6 that the Seventh Circuit has not yet addressed the applicability of the
rule that U.S. courts must assess the discoverability of the request under the law of the forum
of the proceeding. "However, a plain reading of the statute does not require a district court
to explore whether the discovery is allowed in the foreign forum.'" Moreover, the court
conduded that discovery was allowable with certain modifications based on two considerations:
first, the Second Circuit and a district court in the Northern District of Illinois'.. have held
that discovery could proceed at the district court's discretion and second, 26(b)(1) "indicates
that the court should be permissive.
'' 19
C. THE EXISTENCE OF A FOREIGN PROCEEDING
Another topic related to Section 1782 is whether or not the American court recognizes the
existence of a foreign "proceeding."
1. Lancaster Factoring Co. Ltd. v. Mangone
4
0
The Second Circuit stated in Lancaster Factoring Co. Ltd. v. Mangone14' that the term "proceed-
ing" has been given an increasingly broad reading by courts. The Second Circuit here reiterated
its interpretation of section 1782 "to mean a proceeding in which an adjudicative function is
being exercised" and went on to condude that a bankruptcy proceeding dearly falls within
this area.
42
2. In re Application of Mats Wilander and Karel Novacek 4l
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania, however, found in In re Application of Mats Wilander
and Karel Novacek'" that nothing in the statute or legislative history of section 1782 suggests
that completely nongovernmental private agencies such as the Appeals Committee of the Interna-
tional Tennis Federation meet the requirements of being a tribunal.
134. Id. at 540.
135. No. 96-C-1220, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15255 (E.D. M11. Oct. 8, 1996).
136. Id.
137. Id. at *27.
138. See Verson Int'l Ltd. v. Allied Prod. Corp., No. 87C-7549, 1987 WL 17837 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 1987).
139. Elm Energy, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15255 at *26-*30.
140. 90 F.3d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 1996).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 41-42.
143. No. 96 Misc. 98, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10357 (E.D. Pa. July 24, 1996) at *6.
144. Id. at *6.
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D. INTERESTED PARTIES AND THEIR RIGHTS
1. In re Esses'
4 5
The Second Circuit addressed the issue of who is an "interested person" in In re Esses,'4
a proceeding arising out of a familial dispute over the intestate death of a brother. The court
found that the decedent's brother was an interested party due to his involvement in a proceeding
in which he sought to be named as the estate's administrator. The court rejected an argument
that the living brother should not be considered an interested party because, if he was considered
an interested party, the result would increase inefficiency and perhaps prejudice. The court
stated that "such arguments are misplaced: they go to the possible consequences of finding
[the living brother] ... within the reach of the statute, not to whether he is in fact within
the reach."  Thus, while questions of effect "are properly dealt with under the statute by
the district court in the exercise of its discretionary authority to fashion discovery orders,"
1 48
such questions should not be part of an analysis of who is or is not an interested party.
2. Matos v. Reno49
In Matos v. Reno, et al., " a district court in the Southern District of New York found that
although a party may be an interested party and consequently have standing to move to quash
a subpoena, that right provides no basis for a suit against the Attorney General or a United
States Attorney to enjoin them from cooperating with a foreign investigation."'
E. OBTAINING EVIDENCE FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES
1. United States v. Ruiz-Castro'
2
Finally, in United States v. Ruiz-Castro,'" the Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial of a telephonic
deposition of a criminal defendant's parents, who were located in Mexico. The court noted
the proposal did not satisfy Federal Rule 28(b) because it did not show that the father would
testify before a person authorized to administer oaths.
2. Akan International, Ltd. v. The S.A. Day Mfg. Co."4
Some cases this past year considered various issues in attempting to obtain evidence from
overseas. In Akan International, Ltd., et al. v. The S.A. Day Mfg. Co., a district court in the
Western District of New York examined whether information sought from a corporate party's
foreign affiliate was under that party's "custody and control" so as to be discoverable under
the Federal Rules. The district court stated that "the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rather
than the more complicated procedures of the Hague Convention, generally apply to the discovery
of information in the custody and control of a party's foreign affiliate."' " The court concluded
145. No. 96-9211, 1996 WL 692402 (2d Cir. Dec. 4, 1996).
146. Id.
147. Id. at *3.
148. Id.
149. No. 96 CIV 2974, 1996 WL 467519 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 1996).
150. Id.
151. Id. at *3.
152. 92 F.3d 1519 (loth Cir. 1996).
153. Id. at 1532-33.
154. No 94-CV-286C(H), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15928 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 1996).
155. Id. at *7 (citing cases).
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that "[d]efendant cannot be allowed to shield crucial documents from discovery by parties
with whom it has dealt in the United States merely by storing them with its affiliate abroad.""'
3. Popular Imports, Inc. v. Wong's Int'l, Inc.
A federal court in the Eastern District of New York considered what the proper procedure
would be if a U.S. court allows depositions to be taken overseas pursuant to an underlying
action in the United States, and on a later appeal, the appellant attacks the validity of the
depositions. The court in Popular Imports, Inc. v. Wong's Int'l, Inc."' concluded that, if the
objection to the form of the (in this case) Chinese depositions are not raised in the first instance
when the court is deciding whether or not to allow such discovery, objections to form may
not be brought up for the first time on appeal."'
VI. Personal Jurisdiction*
A. INTRODUCTION
No monumental developments appeared in the law of jurisdiction in 1996. Still, smaller-scale
developments of interest continue, most notably in the areas of nationwide service of process
and national contacts theory.
B. NATIONWIDE SERVICE/NATIONAL CONTACTS
Considerable litigation has arisen in 1996 where plaintiffs have invoked nationwide service
of process provisions in a cause of action arising under federal law and have asserted as a
jurisdictional basis a foreign defendant's contacts with the entire United States. Plaintiffs may
ground such assertions of jurisdiction on the service provisions of a substantive statute" or
upon FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 4(k)(2), 60 adopted in 199 3 at the prompting of the
Supreme Court' 6' to "correct a gap in the enforcement of federal law.'
62
1. Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse)' 6'
In Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse), a creditors' action for fraud, conversion,
and civil RICO violations, the court found subject matter jurisdiction based on the RICO
claim. Despite RICO's provision for nationwide service of process, however, the court based
its analysis of personal jurisdiction on Rule 4(k)(2).6 4 On Credit Lyonnais's motion to dismiss,
156. Id. (citation omitted).
157. 166 F.R.D. 276 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
158. Id. at 278.
*Daniel C. Malone is with the law firm of Malone, Davie & Dennis in El Paso, Texas.
159. Examples are the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1965(d),
and federal securities law, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v(a), 78aa.
160. Rule 4(k)(2), entitled Territorial Limits of Effective Service, provides:
If the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States,
serving a summons or filing a waiver of service is also effective, with respect to claims arising
under federal law, to establish personal jurisdiction over the person of any defendant who is not
subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of general jurisdiction of any state.
161. See Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97 (1987).
162. FED. R. Cry. P. 4(k)(2) advisory committee's note.
163. 192 B.R. 73 (Banks. S.D.N.Y. 1996).
164. Id. at 79.
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the court determined that two of the creditors' allegations satisfied a minimum contacts test:
first, that proceeds of accounts receivable, on Credit Lyonnais's instructions, passed through
its New York clearing account, and second, that "Credit Lyonnais sent numerous wire communi-
cations in furtherance of a scheme to defraud, many of them, at least, into the United States."'
The court further noted that these acts related to the creditors' claims.
The Bank Brussels Lambert court thus appeared to use national contacts analysis to establish
specific jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. In addition, the court found a basis of supplemental
jurisdiction over the state law claims, avoiding Credit Lyonnais's claim that no personal jurisdic-
tion existed under New York law. Such an approach is consistent with previous decisional law
and with the Advisory Committee's expectation in drafting the rule.'66 It is worth noting that
the court, which briefly presented its reasoning on personal jurisdiction, gave no indication
that it had determined that there was no basis of personal jurisdiction in a state court of general
jurisdiction, as the Rule requires.
2. Pbarmacbemie B. V. v. Pbarmacia S.p.A.
16 7
This prerequisite to personal jurisdiction based on Rule 4(k)(2) has inevitably produced twists
in litigation. In Pbarmacbemie B. V. v. Pbarmacia S.p.A., for example, defendant Pharmacia
S.p.A., an Italian corporation, sought dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction of an action for
a declaration of patent noninfringement instituted by Pharmachemie, a Netherlands company.
Pharmachemie advanced Rule 4(k)(2) as the sole basis of jurisdiction. In order to defeat the
application of the Rule to establish personal jurisdiction in the District Court for the District
of Massachusetts, the defendant contested the jurisdiction of the Massachusetts courts of general
jurisdiction, while seeking to establish that jurisdiction was proper in both Ohio and New
Mexico. The plaintiff disputed this contention and also argued that under federal patent law,
the cause of action was subject to the jurisdiction of the District Court for the District of
Columbia, a court that the plaintiff characterized as one of general jurisdiction. Pharmacia
S.p.A. contended that the jurisdictional provision in the patent statute6 "supersede[d] any
policy, need, or arguable applicability of Rule 4(k)(2) vis-a-vis foreign patentees."169
The court found no jurisdiction in Ohio and New Mexico, reasoning that the plaintiffs
claim did not arise out of Pharmacia S.p.A.'s limited contacts with those states. While expressing
sympathy with the defendant's argument that the gap-filling policy behind Rule 4(k)(2) is not
implicated where, as in the patent statute, no gap in authority to effect service exists, the court
declined to disregard the Rule's plain language. It accepted the plaintiffs argument that the
District Court for the District of Columbia is not a court of general jurisdiction within the
terms of the Rule. 7" The court thus found no bar to the application of Rule 4(k)(2) and
exercised jurisdiction.
165. Id. at 79-80 (citation omitted).
166. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2)
advisory committee's note.
167. 934 F. Supp. 484 (D. Mass. 1996).
168. 35 U.S.C. § 293.
169. Pbarmacbemie, 934 F. Supp. at 488 (citation omitted).
170. Id. ("The court of general jurisdiction in the District of Columbia is the Superior Court.... Inasmuch
as the United States District Court for the District of Columbia is, like all federal courts, a court of limited
jurisdiction, the literal requirements for the exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 4(k)(2) are satisfied").
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Despite the litigation over Rule 4(k)(2)'s application, in some cases, courts have not indicated
an awareness of the operation of the Rule.' 7' Whether these omissions represent a failure of
counsel is unclear from the decisions. In any case, the apparent increase in reported decisions
considering national contacts theory under Rule 4(k)(2) and the success with which plaintiffs
have used the Rule to establish a basis of personal jurisdiction in international cases make a
continuation of such omissions unlikely.
C. DISCOVERY OF JURISDICTIONAL FACTS
I. El-Fadl v. Central Bank of Jordan"'
Jurisdictional facts are discoverable and courts have denied motions to dismiss, despite finding
no basis of personal jurisdiction, in order to permit a party the opportunity to discover facts estab-
lishing jurisdiction. In El-Fadv. CentralBank oflordan, plaintiff EI-Fadl sued for wrongful termina-
tion, malicious prosecution, and false arrest. After affirming the dismissal of several defendants
based on sovereign immunity, the court considered EI-Fadl's appeal of the district court's dismissal
as to Petra Bank, ajordanian banking company. The appellate court found that EI-Fadl had prop-
erly alleged general jurisdiction under the District of Columbia statute, but had not made out a
primafacie case that Petra Bank was "doing business" in the District of Columbia."' The court
therefore reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded the relevant claims to the district
court to allow EI-Fadl to conduct "reasonable discovery" on the issues of personal jurisdiction.' 4
D. STREAM OF COMMERCE THEORY
The division evident within the Supreme Court in Asabi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court."
over the conditions under which nonforum acts with forum effects can provide a basis of personal
jurisdiction that satisfies due process continues to trouble the lower courts. Trial courts are faced
with two principal due process standards. The first, enunciated by justice O'Connor and joined
in by three otherJustices, requires activity intentionally directed at the forum. The second, put
forward by Justice Brennan and joined in by three other Justices, calls only for foreseeability of
forum effects coupled with benefits derived directly or indirectly from the nonforum activity. In
addition, trial courts may seek to reconcile Justice Stevens' separate concurrence, joined in by
two Justices, which states that due process "requires a constitutional determination that is affected
by the volume, the value, and the hazardous character" of components manufactured by a defen-
dant and incorporated for delivery to the forum by another party.'76
1. Viam Corp. v. Iowa Export-Import Trading Co.'
In Viam Corp. v. Iowa Export-Import Trading Co., Viam, a California corporation and plaintiff
below, appealed the dismissal by the District Court for the Central District of California of
171. See, e.g., Boon Partners v. Advanced Fin. Concepts, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 392, 397 (E.D.N.C. 1996) (stating
that "[b]ecause RICO and federal securities law provide for nationwide service of process, national contacts theory
applies" (emphasis added)); Hershey Pasta Group v. Vitelli-Elvea Co., 921 F. Supp. 1344, 1346 (M.D. Pa. 1996)
("Because the Lanham Act does not authorize national service of process, the court must look to the laws of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to determine whether it may exercise personal jurisdiction of the instant non-resi-
dent corporate Defendants") (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e)); In re Schwinn Bicycle Co., 192 BR. 461, 470-71 (Bankr.
N.D. I1. 1996) (in finding jurisdiction based on national contacts analysis, court cites to pre-Rule 4(kX2) authority).
172. 75 F.3d 668 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
173. Id. at 675.
174. Id. at 676.
175. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
176. Id. at 122.
177. 84 F.3d 424 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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its declaratory judgment action against Spal Corporation, an Italian corporation and holder of
the patent at issue, for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit looked to Spal's U.S. marketing agreement with Iowa Export, Spal's co-defendant. The
Court also considered Iowa Export's use of Spal's catalog in advertising and selling Spal's
invention and its regular reports to Spal on U.S. sales in finding a chain of distribution from
Spal through Iowa Export. The court further found that Spal "knowingly and intentionally
exploited the California market" through Iowa Export's advertising in California and by estab-
lishing channels for providing regular advice in the state.'7 8 These activities on the part of Spal
and its U.S. distributor, in the court's view, established the contacts necessary to a finding of
jurisdiction under either of the two leading theories expressed in Asabi.'7' In concluding that
an exercise of jurisdiction was fair and reversing the district court, the federal circuit court
noted both Spal's strong connection to California and its initiation, together with Iowa Export,
of a suit to enforce the same patent in the same California court that had dismissed Viam's
case. 'so
2. Hershey Pasta Group v. Vitelli-Elvea Co.'
This unresolved interpretive split has left trial courts struggling to apply the limits of the
Due Process Clause to the facts at hand. In Hershey Pasta Group v. Vitelli-Elvea Co., a Lanham
Act action for false labelling of pasta products, the court sought to reconcile the O'Connor
and Brennan positions. The court observed that placing a product in the stream of commerce
with the knowledge that a "significant quantity will regularly be distributed in the forum
state, "12 together with an intent to derive profits from that distribution, satisfied the O'Connor
requirement of intentionality as well as the Brennan foreseeability test. Noting that the defen-
dants, two Turkish manufacturers, must have been aware of distribution in Pennsylvania since
they had fulfilled the state's requirement of purchasing a bakery license and because a substantial
volume of their U.S. sales occurred in Pennsylvania, the court found knowledge of distribution
and intent to derive profit. Thus, the required knowledge and intent existed under the blended
standard, meaning that minimum contacts with the forum existed. The forum ties of the plaintiff,
a Delaware corporation with a principal place of business in Pennsylvania, provided an additional
factor favoring an exercise of jurisdiction over the foreign defendants. 8'
E. TRANSIENT JURISDICTION
1. R. Griggs Group Ltd. v. Filanto S.p.A." 4
While "tag" service is a valid means of establishing personal jurisdiction under United States
law,"' litigation arises over the effects of such service. In R. Griggs Group Ltd. v. Filanto S.p.A.,
an action for trademark infringement, plaintiff R. Griggs Group Ltd., a United Kingdom
178. Id. at 429.
179. Id. at 428.
180. Id. at 430. The court also vacated the portion of the district court's opinion in which it had declined
to permit Viam to correct its attempt at serving Spal under the Hague Convention. Id.
181. 921 F. Supp. 1344 (M.D. Pa. 1996).
182. Id. at 1348.
183. Id. at 1350.
184. 920 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Nev. 1996).
185. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604(1990). Fora recent decision discussing personal jurisdiction
based on transient presence in the context of asserted United Nations headquarters and federal common law
immunities, see Kadic v. Karadik, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
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corporation, served Lumo, an employee of defendant Filanto, at a trade show in Las Vegas.
Filanto filed a motion to quash service based on defective service process, which the court
considered a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of process under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(5). The court determined that Griggs "ha[d] made no showing that Mr. Lumo was
sufficiendy integrated with the organization to render service upon him fair, reasonable, and
just."'8 6 Given the burden on the plaintiff to establish effective service and Griggs's failure to
refute Filanto's affidavit asserting that Lumo was not authorized to receive service, the court
found the tag service ineffective to establish personal jurisdiction over Filanto, even though
Griggs had not yet taken discovery on the issue.
VII. Service of Process Abroad*
A. INTRODUCrbON
While no major innovations or changes concerning service of process abroad transpired
during 1996, the 1993 amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 have made the federal
judiciary more cognizant of the methods available for effecting foreign service. As a result,
where a defendant, whether an individual or corporation, cannot be "found" physically in the
United States, courts have increasingly required plaintiffs to serve the foreign defendant in its
own nation rather than permitting substituted service in the United States.'
B. SERVICE ABROAD UNDER RULE 4(0
If the foreign defendant is located in a signatory state to the Hague Service Convention,'
courts have ordered plaintiffs to effect service under it pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4(0(1). And if the foreign defendant is located in a state that is not a signatory to the Convention,
the courts have not hesitated to require that service be made pursuant to FRCP 4(0(2), which
authorizes service as permitted by the law of the foreign state in which service is to be effected.89
186. Id. at 1102 (citation omitted).
*David R. Lagasse is with the law firm Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts in New York City.
187. See, e.g., Viam Corp. v. Iowa Export-Import Trading Co, 84 F.3d 424, 430 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (parties
concede that service under Hague Convention is sufficient); United States v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters,
No. 88 Civ. 4486, 1996 WL 655808, at "3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 1996) (ordering plaintiff to effect service on
Canadian corporation pursuant to Hague Service Convention, even though corporation controlled subsidiary
corporation in United States).
188. Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial
Matters, Feb. 10, 1969, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter Hague Service
Convention or Convention].
189. Courts have generally understood that the subsections within Rule 4(0 are sequential, such that a plaintiff
may only effect service pursuant to subsection (fX2) if it cannot serve pursuant to subsection f(l). See, e.g., Ty
v. Celle, No. 95 Civ. 2631, 1996 WL 452408, at * 3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 1996) (finding Rule 4(f(l) inapplicable
on ground that Philippines are not party to Hague Convention before evaluating service under Rule 4(f(2)).
The courts have similarly interpreted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act's service provision, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1608(b). For example, one court recently quashed service on a foreign airline because the plaintiff failed to
show that service could not be effected on the defendant pursuant to a special arrangement between the parties,
the first method authorized under the FSIA, or service under the Hague Service Convention, the second authorized
method, before resorting to other means of service. See Seramur v. Saudi Arabian Airlines, 934 F. Supp. 48, 52
(E.D.N.Y. 1996) (plaintiff did attempt to effect service on defendant's agent located in United States pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1608(bX2); however, plaintiff faded to rebut defendant's evidence that individual served was not
"an officer, a managing agent or any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of
process in the United States").
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1. Cosmetecb Int'l, L.LC. v. Der Kwei Enterprise & Co., Ltd.9 °
The district court upheld service made in Taiwan on Der Kwei Enterprise, a Taiwanese
corporation, pursuant to Rule 4(0(2)."' While Der Kwei conducted extensive business in the
United States and its officers frequently attended meetings here, Der Kwei maintained no U.S.
office or place of business." 2 Accordingly, the plaintiff effected personal service by delivery of
the summons and complaint on a Der Kwei officer and its managing agent in Taiwan, as
permitted by Taiwanese law."'
2. Ty v. Cell
1 4
The district court found that service was improper where a plaintiff attempted to serve by
registered mail a foreign defendant whose primary place of business was in the Philippines."'
Because the Philippine Islands are not a signatory to the Hague Service Convention, the court
found that service had to be effected pursuant to Rule 4(0(2)." 6 The court noted that Philippine
law requires that a sheriff or other court officer effect service."' Because the plaintiffs attorney,
who mailed the summons and complaint to the defendant in the Philippines, was not an officer
appointed by the Philippine court, the attempted service was invalid.
C. SUBSTITUTED SERVICE ON FOREIGN DEFENDANTS
Rule 4(o has not changed the vitality of substituted service on foreign defendants: the Federal
Rules still authorize substituted service pursuant to Rule 4(h) which permits service on a foreign
corporate defendant pursuant to state law or by delivery of the summons and complaint to
an officer, managing agent or agent authorized by law to receive service within the United
States. With the enactment of Rule 4(k)(2)," practitioners feared that plaintiffs would be
empowered to serve, without resort to the Hague Convention or other method of service
abroad, any foreign defendant who had sufficient contacts in the United States to be jurisdiction-
ally present, provided some means could be found or invented that would enable the plaintiff
to effect service within the territory of the United States."' These concerns proved unfounded
in 1996. Even in situations where an arguable basis for substituted service within the United
States existed, several courts still ordered service to be effected abroad pursuant to Rule 4(0.
1. Cosmetecb Int'l2""
In addition to effecting personal delivery on Der Kwei's officers in Taiwan, the plaintiff in
Cosmetecb Int'l attempted to effect substituted service on it by serving its technical consultant
190. No. 95 Civ. 9993, 1996 WL 583376 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 1996).
191. Id. at *4.
192. Id. at *1-2.
193. Id. at *4.
194. No. 95 Civ. 2631, 1996 WL 452408 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 1996)
195. Id. at "3.
196. Id. at *2-3.
197. Id. at *3.
198. Courts have interpreted the phrase "arising under federal law" in FRCP 4(kX2) broadly to include not
only federal question jurisdiction, but also all substantive federal law claims. See World Tanker Carrier Corp. v.
MV YA Mawlaya, No. 96-30095, 1996 WL 628055, at *3 (sth Cir. Nov. 14,1996) (finding substantive maritime
law of the United States to be federal law); see also United Trading Co., S.A. v. MV. Sakura Refer, No. 95-2846,
1996 WL 374154, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 1996). FRCP 4(kX2) excludes only diversity jurisdiction.
199. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4, supplementary practice commentaries (West Supp. 1996).
200. No. 95 Civ. 9993, 1996 WL 583376 (S.D.N.Y Oct.9, 1996); see supra part B.I.
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in the United States.2"' Notably, the technical consultant's relationship with the defendant was
highly integrated: first, the consultant operated under Der Kwei's name as "Der Kwei Enterprise
Technical Services;" 2"2 and second, the consultant conducted itself as Der Kwei's agent by,
among other activities, communicating with its U.S. customers, developing and implementing
market strategy, arranging meetings, and negotiating on its behalf."' The court, however, did
not comment on whether the substituted service on the U.S. agent was adequate under 4(h)(I),
preferring to find that service had been appropriately made in Taiwan under 4(h)(2) (which
incorporates Rule 4(0).24
2. Skigb Corp. v. Van Dijk20'
The plaintiff attempted to serve Bureau Van Dijk (BvD), a Belgium corporation, by substituted
service pursuant to New York law. New York permits substituted service on a foreign corpora-
tion by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to the Secretary of State, and mailing
a copy of the summons and complaint to the defendant's usual abode or place of business. ' °6
The plaintiff, however, failed to mail a copy of the complaint to the defendant in Belgium,
its principal place of business, as required by the statute.07 Accordingly, the court found that
service was incomplete, and therefore dismissed the complaint.
It is of note, however, that the court did not specifically require that service of the summons
and complaint in Belgium be accomplished pursuant to the Hague Convention. The plaintiff
never attempted to serve BvD by mail (or by any other means) in Belgium. Accordingly, the
court only found that its service was incomplete. It is unclear whether the court would have
reached the same conclusion if the plaintiff had attempted service by mail in Belgium without
complying with the Convention.
3. In re Matter of Complaint of Get Wet Water Sports, Inc."20
Despite the trend towards relying on service abroad in order to acquire jurisdiction, some
courts have continued to find creative means to avoid requiring service to be made on a foreign
defendant abroad. The district court in Get Wet Water Sports found that service did not need
to be made on a foreign manufacturer in a limitation action and accordingly denied its motion
to quash service of process on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the
Hague Convention.0 9 Following a boating accident in which the plaintiff had leased a jet ski
manufactured by the foreign corporation to the injured party, the plaintiff initiated a limitation
action pursuant to admiralty law.' 0 The court found that Supplemental Rule F(4) of the
Admiralty Rules, which govern such actions, required only that the plaintiff give notice by
201. Id. at *3.
202. Id. at *2.
203. Id. at *3; seealso AT&T Co. v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1996)(plaintiff
opted to serve foreign corporation in Belgium, its primary place of business, even though it predicated court's
jurisdiction on defendant's contacts with forum only through its U.S. subsidiary); Seramur v. Saudi Arabian
Airlines, 934 F. Supp. 48, 52 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (service required under Hague Convention despite fact that airline
maintained place of business in New York).
204. Id. at *4.
205. No. 95 Civ. 3053, 1996 WL 219638 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 1996).
206. Id. at *6.
207. Id.
208. No. Civ. 95-6116, 1996 WL 162073 (D.N.J. Mar. 18, 1996).
209. Id. at *2.
210. Id.
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publication to potential claimants, such as the jet ski's foreign manufacturer." The court
reasoned that a notice requirement could not be equated with service, and therefore personal
service on a claimant was unnecessary. Accordingly, even though Rule F(4) also required the
plaintiff to mail a notice to each claimant, the Hague Convention was not triggered." 2
D. DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING THE HAGUE CONVENTION
1. New Signatories to the Convention
Three states signed onto the Convention effective in 1996: Switzerland, Poland, and Estonia.
Both Switzerland and Poland have reserved generally from permitting alternative service pursuant
to both Articles 8 and 10.' " Estonia has only made a reservation as to Article 10(c), which
would otherwise permit service through judicial officers or other competent state officials.2"4
2. Mail Service Under The Hague Convention
The Circuit Courts continue to disagree on whether Article 10(a) of the Convention authorizes
service on a foreign defendant by registered mail, assuming that the foreign signatory state has
not objected to it.2 ' Article 10(a) uses the term "send" as opposed to "service," and courts
have disagreed as to whether it authorizes service by mail or is restricted to the transmission
of judicial documents after a lawsuit has been properly commenced.
a. Brand v. Mazda Motor of Am., InC.216
The plaintiff attempted to serve Mazda Motor Corporation by registered mail in Hiro-
shima, Japan.21' Though Japan is a signatory to the Convention and it has not objected to
Article 10(a), the defendant moved to quash service on the ground that 10(a) does not
authorize a valid means of service.' Following the Eighth Circuit's lead, the district court
stated that it was reluctant to believe the drafters of Article 10(a) were careless in using
"send" as opposed to "service" where they had carefully used the word "service" throughout
the remainder of the Convention. 29 Accordingly, the court held the mail service invalid.
b. Golub v. Isuzu Motor 220
Similarly, where the plaintiff mailed the summons and complaint, written in English, to
Isuzu Motors in Japan, the district court quashed service on the ground that Article I0(a) did
211. Id.
212. Id.
2 13. See Switzerland, Notification in Conformity with Article 31 of the Convention on the Service Abroad
of Judicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (Dec. 12, 1994); Republic of Poland, Notification in
Conformity with Article 31 of the Convention on the Service Abroad ofJudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial
Matters (Feb. 16, 1996).
214. Republic of Estonia, Notification in Conformity with Article 31 of the Convention on the Service Abroad
of Judicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (Sept. 16, 1996); see also infra note 213.
215. Article 10(a) of the Hague Evidence Convention states: "Provided the State of destination does not
object, the present Convention shall not interfere with-(a) the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal
channels, directly to persons abroad .... " Hague Service Convention, art. 10(a), 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S,
6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 163. Service by mail is available pursuant to Article 10(a) even if otherwise prohibited
by Rule 4 because the Convention supplements Rule 4, providing independent means of service. See G.A.
Modefine v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp., 164 F.R.D. 24, 25-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
216. 920 F. Supp. 1169 (D. Kan. 1996).
217. Id. at 1170.
218. Id. at 1170-71.
219. Id. at 1172.
220. 924 F. Supp. 324 (D. Mass. 1996).
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not authorize service by mail.22 ' First, the court held that the plain meaning of the word "send"
did not include service. 2 Second, the court noted that in construing a treaty, a court must
presume that the drafters act intentionally when they indude particular language in one section
but alter or omit that language in another.22' Accordingly, the court concluded that had the
drafters intended to permit service by mail, they would have used that term. 4 Finally, the court
found that, even though Japan did not object to Article 10(a) when it signed the Convention, it
was not dear that it intended to permit service by mail; its own internal law permits such
service only through a court clerk.2" This factor weighed against finding that the plaintiff had
effected proper service.
c. R. Griggs Group, Ltd. v. Filanto, S.PA.22 6
In contrast, a district court in the Ninth Circuit, following the Second Circuit, conduded
that the term "send" includes service of process by mail. 2" The plaintiff served Filanto, an
Italian corporation, by Federal Express at its offices in Italy, and the defendant challenged the
service as improper under the Convention.2" The court rejected the defendant's motion, how-
ever, deciding that send was properly considered a synonym for serve because the Convention
concerned only service of process.2 ' Given that context, it would be anomalous to believe
that Article 10(a) did not authorize a means to effect service. 30 In addition, the court relied
on both a special commission, appointed in 1989 by the Convention's signatory nations to
discuss its operation, 2" and the U.S. State Department,232 both of whom concluded that Article
10(a) authorizes a method of service. "
E. DEFECTIVE SERVICE UNLIKELY TO BE DisPosrriwE ISSUE
Because of the U.S. courts' increasing comfort with ordering service to be effected abroad,
attorneys attempting to initiate lawsuits against foreign defendants would be better advised to
serve pursuant to Rule 4(0. Conversely, foreign defendants are more likely to be successful in
getting courts to entertain motions to dismiss on the ground that service was not effected
221. Id. at 326.




226. 920 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Nev. 1996).
227. Id. at 1104-07. District courts within the Ninth Circuit are also split as to the proper interpretation of
Article 10(a), see Gonnuscio v. Seabrand Shipping Ltd., 908 F. Supp. 823, 825 (D. Or. 1995) (finding that Article
10(a) does not authorize service of process by mail), while district courts in the Second Circuit continue to
consistently construe it as authorizing service by mail, see Modefine, 164 F.R.D. at 25-26 (finding service of process
by international registered mail proper under Hague Service Convention). For a similar holding, see also Robins
v. Max Mara, U.S.A., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 460, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
228. Filanto, 920 F. Supp. at 1102.
229. Id. at 1104-05.
230. Id. at 1105.
231. See PRACTICAL HANDBOOK ON THE OPERATION OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 15 NOVEMBER 1965 ON
THE SERVICE ABROAD OF JUDICIAL AND EXTRAJUDICIAL DOCUMENTS IN CIVIL OR CoMMERCIAL MArrERs, 44-45 (2d
ed. 1992).
232. See Letter from Alan J. Kreczko, U.S. Department of State Deputy Legal Advisor to the Administrative
Office of United States Courts and the National Center for State Courts (Mar. 14, 1991), rpinted in 30 1.L.M.
260 (1991).
233. See Filanto, 920 F. Supp. at 1106. The Special Commission noted that the signatory states would not
have had the opportunity to object to Article 10(a) unless it provided a basis for service. Id.
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abroad and is therefore improper. Litigants should be aware, however, that any such success
by a foreign defendant is likely to be only pyrrhic. Courts continue to respond to such motions
by dismissing the complaint without prejudice and extending the time period for service, thereby
permitting the plaintiff to reserve properly.
2 4
VIII. Enforcement of Foreign Judgments*
A. INTRODUCTION
Whether the courts of the United States will recognize and enforce the judgment of a foreign
state is determined by considerations of "comity," is entirely regulated by domestic law, and
may lead to uncertain results. Comity is the respect for the inherent equality of all nations
and fear of retaliatory actions should we not extend full faith and credit to their judgments."'
The Hague Conference on Private International Law in 19 9 3 placed on its negotiating agenda
the preparation of a convention on this subject. A proposal submitted at the Hague Conference
would have moved to regulate the assertion of jurisdiction as well as require the recognition
and enforcement of judgments from signatory states.236 To date, however, no agreement has
been reached and U.S. efforts to enter into a bilateral or multilateral treaty covering the
recognition and enforcement of judgments have been unsuccessful. 2" This failure stems, in
part, from a reluctance by foreign courts to recognize U.S. judgments, particularly in tort suits
where large awards including punitive damages have been handed down.
B. 1996 CASES
Neither the Supreme Court nor Congress has addressed this general area in 1996.2"' Conse-
quently, state and federal courts continue to follow the liberal approach to foreign judgments
that was first set forth in 1895 by the Supreme Court in Hilton v. Guyot in which comity was
the defining principle.23 Consequently, relatively few cases have declined to recognize a foreign
234. See, e.g., Viam Corp. v. Iowa Export-Import Trading Co., 84 F.3d 424, 430 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (plaintiff
permitted to reserve properly pursuant to Hague Service Convention); Sleigh Corp. v. Van Dijk, No. 95 Civ.
303, 1996 WL 219638, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 1996) (court dismissed plaintiffs complaint subject to reopening
if the plaintiff effected service of process within 60 days); Brand, 920 F. Supp. at 1173 (service quashed but
plaintiff given sixty days to serve foreign corporation in accordance with Hague Service Convention).
*Christopher Gibson is senior legal officer at the World Intellectual Property Organization in Geneva, Switzer-
land.
235. TErrz, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION 253 (1996). The United States is a signatory to the U.N. Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention), 21 U.S.T. 2517,
T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, preempting the field under the supremacy clause of the Constitution and
making foreign nation arbitral awards entitled to recognition in state courts.
2 3 6. D. EPSTEIN & J. SNYDER, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION: A GUIDE TO JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND STRATEGY
§ 11-2 (2d ed. Supp. 1996).
237. In contrast, there are several multilateral conventions in force among European countries (e.g., the Conven-
tion on Jurisdiction and Enforcement ofJudgsents in Civil and Commercial Matters, dated September 16, 1988).
238. As there is no federal treaty or statute, the recognition and enforceability of foreign court judgments is
determined by state rather than federal law. While each of the states has been left to develop its own approach, most
have adopted the principles of Hilton v. Guyot and a number have adopted the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act (UFMJRA or Act), which incorporates the principles found in Hilton. 13 U.L.A. 261 (1962).
Under the Act, a presumption exists in favor of enforcing a foreign judgment as long as it is conclusive between
the parties. The Act also contains a list of reasons to refuse to recognize a foreign judgment. See generally TErrz,
spra note 235, at § 8- 3. The RESTATEMENT ( HIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) or REsTATEMENT] §§ 481-482 (1987) also generally incorporates the principles of Hilton.
See generally id. § 8-2.
239. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
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court judgment on any grounds. The defect in the foreign proceeding must be so serious as
to overcome the strong presumption against permitting collateral attack on the foreign judgment.
The following 1996 cases illustrate these points.
1. Ramirez v. United States2"
Alfredo Urbina Ramirez owned some 250 acres in Las Delicias, Honduras, which he had
leased to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Army). He sued the Army in a Honduran court
to enforce a provision in the lease to the effect that the land should be returned "in as good
a condition as that existing at the time" the lease began. The Army had used and altered the
land and structures on the land for military training.
Ramirez alleged breach of contract and physical damage to his land, and obtained a judgment
against the Army for approximately S1.5 million. Ramirez then filed suit in the United States
Court of Federal Claims, seeking recognition and enforcement of the Honduran trial court's
judgment.
In this case of first impression, the Court of Federal Claims considered whether the Honduran
judgment could be enforced against the United States government. Citing Hilton, the court
observed that, in the absence of any statutory or constitutional requirement, federal courts
normally "will enforce a foreign judgment that is valid and fair pursuant to the doctrine of
comity." The court also noted, however, that the "federal sovereign's consent to be sued must
be explicit." In particular, the Court of Federal Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction created
to permit a special and limited class of cases to proceed against the U.S. Government.
Ramirez relied on the Tucker Act to provide the necessary statutory basis for jurisdiction.24 '
The court found that monetary relief may be granted under this Act only "if it is expressly
authorized by a separate statute, a constitutional provision, a regulation or a contract. 21 2
Accordingly, the court held that common law causes of action are not induded within this
jurisdictional grant and the Tucker Act's consent to suit does not extend to the common law
doctrine of comity as a basis for enforcing the foreign judgment against the government.243
2. Matter of Arbitration Between Cbromalloy Aeroservices and Arab Republic of Egypt2 4
This case involved a suit brought by petitioner Chromalloy Aeroservices against the Egyptian
Airforce to enforce a foreign arbitral award in excess of S15 million. Less than a month after
Chromalloy sued for enforcement, the Egyptian Air Force appealed from the award to the
Egyptian Court of Appeal, which eventually issued an order nullifying the award; the Egyptian
240. 36 Fed. Cl. 467 (1996).
241. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a). The Tucker Act grants the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction "to renderjudgment
upon any claim against the United States founded upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation
of an executive department, or any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or
unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." Id. at § 1491(aX1).
242. 36 Fed. Cl. at 472. As to that portion of the Tucker Act granting the Federal Claims Court jurisdiction
on a claim "for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort," the court viewed this jurisdictional
basis as a "legal orphan" that remains "unfamiliar" to the court, and ruled that it is "far too late to interpret
the current language of § 149 1(aX 1) as authorizing claims based on anything other than contracts and legislation."
Id. at 473.
243. The court also rejected Ramirez's assertion that his enforcement action was founded in contract and so
was within the Tucker Act's jurisdictional grant, because an action to enforce a judgment based on a contract
action is "once-removed" from an express contract action. Id. The court held that "[a]n action to enforce a
foreign judgment founded on any claim . . . is not cognizable under the Tucker Act." Id. (emphasis added).
244. 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996).
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Air Force then brought a motion before the district court to dismiss Chromalloy's petition to
enforce. The district court considered two issues: (1) as an initial matter, the enforcement and
validity of the award itself, and (2) the effect to be given to an Egyptian Court of Appeal
decision nullifying that award.
The court first determined that it was within its discretion whether or not to refuse to
enforce the award. Under artide V of the Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards (Convention),2 45 "[riecognition and enforcement of the award may
be refused" if Egypt furnished proof that the award has been set aside by a competent authority
of the country or law under which the award was made. '2 " In this case the award was made
in Egypt, under the laws of Egypt, and was nullified by the court designated by Egypt to
review arbitral awards. The district court noted, however, that while article V was discretionary,
article VII was not discretionary and preserved all of the rights to enforcement of the award
that Chromalloy would have had in the absence of the Convention.247
The district court next considered an issue of "first impression," i.e., "whether the decision
of the Egyptian court should be recognized as a valid foreign judgment. '2 4' The court looked
for guidance in a 1974 Supreme Court decision where the Court stated:
An agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal is, in effect, a specialized kind of forum-selection
clause.... The invalidation of such an agreement ... would not only allow the respondent to
repudiate its solemn promise but would, as well, reflect a parochial concept that all disputes must
be resolved under our laws and in our courts.249
The district court found this reasoning equally persuasive "where Egypt seeks to repudiate its
solemn promise to abide by the results of the arbitration." '
The court applied a straightforward contractual analysis to conclude that a provision in the
agreement specifically providing that the award is final and binding and not subject to appeal
was not inconsistent with, and in effect overrode, another provision indicating that Egyptian
law would apply to the dispute. Next, the court held that "to recognize the decision of the
Egyptian court would violate [the] dear U.S. public policy" in favor of final and binding
arbitration of commercial disputes.25 Finally, the court stated that "comity never obligates a
national forum to ignore 'the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the
protection of its laws.' ,,252 The court thus concluded that country does not require it to give
res judicata effect to the decision of the Egyptian court."'
245. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-02, 207 (1988).
246. 939 F. Supp. at 909.
247. In the Convention's absence, Chromalloy's rights to enforcement would have been evaluated under the
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 a seq., under which the award would be proper. The court stated, in
particular, that while Egyptian courts may still be concerned that arbitration is an exceptional means for resolving
disputes, "we are well past he time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the competence
of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution." Id.
at 911 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626-27 (1985)).
248. Id.
249. Id. (quoting Sherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974).
250. Id. at 912.
251. Id. at 913.
252. Id. (quoting Hilton, 159 U.S. at 164).
253. Id.
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3. Kukkowskis et al. v. DiLeonardi254
The district court in this case confronted a relatively complex set of issues surrounding the
question of whether the defendants should be extradited to Canada on charges of kidnapping.
Faced with the prospect of imminent removal, the defendants successfully petitioned the court
for habeas corpus relief from a magistrate's order granting extradition. 255 The district court's
analysis hinged on principles stated in Hilton surrounding the recognition of a foreign judgment.
In particular, the court analyzed whether under the "reverse fact scenario" required by the dual
criminality element of the U.S.-Canadian Extradition Treaty,256 a valid Canadian guardianship
decree would be duly recognized by a court in Illinois. Because this element of the Treaty was
not met, defendants could not be extradited to Canada for kidnapping. Defendant DeSilva's
attempt to transport his wife and ward to Illinois from Canada pursuant to a valid Illinois
guardianship order failed this test.
The facts were these. DeSilva and his wife Tammy were involved in a serious car accident
in 1987. Both survived, but Tammy sustained serious injuries to her spine and brain which
left her a quadriplegic with permanent brain damage. DeSilva was appointed, over her parent's
objection and with no restrictions, sole guardian of his wife's estate and person in March 1988;
he eventually moved his wife in July 1989 from Arizona to Winnipeg, Canada, where Tammy
was eligible for socialized health care service. Caring for her daughter, Tammy's mother also
lived with them. DeSilva, unable to find adequate employment in Canada, returned to the
United States in search of work.
In January 1992, DeSilva obtained a court order in Illinois authorizing him to take Tammy
to Chicago to undergo a medical exam. When DeSilva removed Tammy, her mother telephoned
the local Canadian police. When DeSilva and the other defendants (who had volunteered to
help him) arrived at the U.S. border, Canadian customs officials stopped them. In view of the
fact that Tammy's parents had recently obtained an emergency guardianship order from a
Canadian court, all parties agreed that Tammy should be returned to Winnipeg while DeSilva
and the other defendants would continue to Chicago. Later, Canadian authorities charged the
defendants with kidnapping and forcible seizure of Tammy. At Canada's request, the U.S.
Attorney sought extradition of the defendants.
The district court found that because the defendants would not be guilty of kidnapping had
they attempted to remove Tammy from Illinois while acting under a valid Canadian guardianship
order's protection the dual criminality requirement was not met.2" 7 Had DeSilva's hypothetical
Canadian guardianship been obtained in the same manner and under the same conditions as
in the case of his actual Illinois guardianship, comity would have required an Illinois court to
extend recognition. 2" The district court concluded that the hypothetical Canadian decree would
254. 941 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. IMl. 1996).
255. Id. at 745.
256. Under the dual criminality requirement of the United States-Canada Extradition Treaty, the district
court was required to determine whether the defendants' conduct (I) violated Canadian law, and (2) would have
also violated Illinois or federal law had the crime been committed in Illinois. Treaty of Extradition between the
U.S. and Canada, arts. 2 and 10.
257. Citing Hilton, the court stated that the extension of recognition to a foreign country's judgment is
contingent on the establishment of a prima facie case that the judgment is entided to recognition. 941 F. Supp.
at 747. Four factors first set forth in Hilton "are still followed today": (i) the rendering court had jurisdiction
over the person and subject matter; (ii) there was timely notice and an opportunity to present the defense;
(iii) no fraud was involved; and (iv) the proceedings were according to a civilized jurisprudence. Id.
258. Id.
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thus be a bar to a U.S. prosecution against defendants for kidnapping. A Canadian guardian-
like an Illinois guardian-would be incapable of kidnapping his ward from Illinois. The district
court therefore held that the dual criminality element of the Extradition Treaty was not met
and granted the unit.
4. Pitman v. Aran
259
Maxime Pitman, a principal shareholder of the Vendome Investment Group, Inc. (Vendome),
a small Maryland corporation, brought an action against defendant Eli Aran, an officer and
director of Vendome, alleging that through mismanagement, self-dealing, and outright dishon-
esty, he had breached his fiduciary duty and contractual obligations under a promissory note.
Aran counterclaimed seeking enforcement pursuant to the Maryland UFMJRA26° judgment
for attorneys' fees and costs that had purportedly been entered against the plaintiffs in Israel.
The district court ruled that "recognition" and "enforcement" of a judgment are two different
things-although the Israeli judgment was entitled to "recognition" under Maryland law, the
judgment would not be "enforced" by the district court in the absence of a copy of the foreign
judgment.2"' In particular, the court was guided by the Maryland Uniform Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments Act providing, in relevant part, that "a copy of any foreign judgment
authenticated in accordance with an act of Congress or statute of this State" may be enforced.6 2
Aran had failed to produce a copy of the purported judgment, and the district court was
"wholly unpersuaded" by his proffered justifications for failing to so do.26'
5. Wilson v. Marcbington
2 4
Mary Jane Wilson, a member of the Blackfeet Indian Tribe, filed suit in Tribal Court
seeking compensatory and punitive damages for the defendants' alleged negligent operation of
a semi-tractor trailer on a road within the boundaries of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation.
6
'
The defendants were not members of the Tribe nor did they reside or conduct any business
activity within the boundaries of the reservation. The defendants entered an appearance in the
Tribal Court, specifically reserving the right to contest all jurisdictional issues in federal court.
The suit was tried in Tribal Court with a jury finding the defendants liable for the accident and
awarding Wilson approximately $ 250,000. This judgment was later affirmed by the Blackfeet
Supreme Court.
Wilson instituted suit in the district court seeking recognition and registration of the judgment




had previously determined that the Tribal Court was vested with subject matter jurisdiction
over this action. The remaining issue was "whether federal courts and the courts of the several
states must extend full faith and credit to the judgment of a tribal court."26
The district court rejected the notion that either the U.S. Constitution's or the statutory
259. 935 F. Supp. 637 (D. Md. 1996).
260. Md. Code Ann. Cts. and Jud. Proc. § 10-701 t seq.
261. 935 F. Supp. at 650.
262. Md. Code Ann. Cts. and Jud. Proc. § 11-802.
263. 935 F. Supp. at 650.
264. 934 F. Supp. 1187 (D. Mont. 1996).
265. 935 F. Supp. at 1190
266. 42 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir.), cet. denied, 115 S. Ct. 485 (1994).
267. 935 F. Supp. at 1189.
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"full faith and credit dause'2 68 applied to tribal judgments, as the former refers only to judicial
proceedings of States and the latter only to "judgments of any court of such State, Territory
or Possession." This statute does not include Indian tribes.69
This left only "principles of comity [to] control whether the judgment of a tribal court is
entitled to recognition and enforcement. ' , 27° The district court stated that "[riecognition of
the existence of federal question jurisdiction over an action prosecuted for the purpose of
seeking recognition and enforcement of a tribal court judgment is compelled by the relationship
extant between the United States and the various Indian Tribes," '' and held accordingly that
such an action for enforcement presents a "federal question" within the meaning of 2 8 U.S.C.
§ 13 3 1, and therefore the substantive law to be applied is federal."7
Finally, looking at the federal law for recognition of a foreign judgment, the court followed
Hilton's liberal approach. The defendants asserted that the Blackfeet Tribal Court had not af-
forded them "due process of law."2'' The district court, however, ruled that "the mere fact the
procedures employed by a foreign court do not embody the same safeguards recognized as inherent
in the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution is not, in and of itself, a sufficient
ground for impeaching the foreign judgment."274 The court concluded that the defendants' objec-
tions to the procedures in the Tribal Court were insufficient to impeach that court's judgment.
IX. Act of State*
A. INTRODUCTION
This past year produced several cases which provided an interesting application of the act
of state doctrine, where a sovereign dedines to enforce its own public policy rules in the face
of a foreign act of state. More recently, the United States Supreme Court has limited the act
of state doctrine. In WS. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tecbtonics Corp., the Court stated
that "[a]ct of state issues only arise when a court must decide-that is, when the outcome of
268. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
269. 935 F. Supp. at 1190.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1191-92. The court determined:
In view of the unique status occupied by Indian Tribes under our law (citation omitted), it is
... imperative, not only that a uniform body of law develop in relation to the recognition and
enforcement of civil judgments rendered in the various tribal courts, but that the issues relating
to the recognition and enforcement of the judgments be resolved in accordance with federal law.
Id. at 1192.
272. If jurisdiction is predicated on diversity, Montana substantive law would apply to the analysis of whether
to give recognition to the Tribal Court judgment. Further, under the leading Montana precedent, Wippcrt v,
Blackfeet Tribe, 654 P.2d 512, 515 (Mont, 1982), it would be arguable whether a court would recognize the
Tribal Court judgment in this case. 935 F. Supp. at 1192.
273. 935 F. Supp. at 1193.
274. Id. In contrast, theNinth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1995 affirmed a istrict court's refusal to recognize
several Iranian court judgments because plaintiff (1)could not expect fair treatment from the courts of Iran,
(2) could not personally appear before those courts, (3) could not obtain proper legal representation, and (4) could
not even obtain local witnesses on her behalf. Bank Mdli Iran et al. v. Pablavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 519 (1995). The court stated that "[it has long been the law of the United States
that aforeign judgment cannot be enforced if it was obtained in a manner that did not accord with the basics of
due process," id. (citing REsrOMENT § 482(lXa)), and that hese "are not mere niceties of American jurisprudence
... [but] are ingredients of basic due process." Id. (citation omitted).
*Whitney Debevoise, Vice-Chair of the International Litigation C mmittee, is a member of the firm Arnold
& Porter in Washington, D.C.
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the case turns upon-the effect of official action by a foreign sovereign. When that question
is not in the case, neither is the act of state doctrine." ' ' Two new cases illustrate this point.
B. Two CASES
I. Hargrove v. Underwriters at Lloyd's Londm' 276
In this case, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas held that the
act of state doctrine preduded the granting of any relief to the plaintiffs on their daims based on
the defendants' failure to properly negotiate or pay ransom."' Plaintiff Thomas Hargrove was
an employee of Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical d/b/a CIAT (CIAT) and was kid-
napped in Colombia by FARC guerrillas. CIAT refused to negotiate with the kidnappers for
Hargrove's release,27 a position guided by an act passed by the Colombian legislature, The Anti-
Abduction Act of 199 3, which forbade negotiations with kidnappers and payment of ransom. 2"
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' failure to properly negotiate for Hargrove's release con-
stituted a breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing. The defendants moved to dismiss on lack
of subject matter jurisdiction grounds by virtue of the act of state doctrine.28
In applying the Kirkpatrick test, the district court found that "the outcome of the Plaintiffs'
claims depends on a determination of the propriety of the Colombian government's decision
as to the best method to combat... terrorist abductions ... "28' Thus, the act of state doctrine
precluded the granting of any relief to the plaintiffs on their claims arising out of the defendants'
failure to negotiate for Hargrove's release and their failure to pay ransom."'
2. Miller v. United States"83
In this case, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio held that the
act of state doctrine was inapplicable where the plaintiffs alleged that the United States Govern-
ment had wrongfully used the plaintiffs' father's property to satisfy a third party's tax debt.284
Mr. Miller, the plaintiffs' father, had filed a false tax return.2"' With Mr. Miller in jail, the
government set about colecting his unpaid taxes. Mr. Miller, however, had previously resided
in the Netherlands and under a 1948 tax treaty, the government was able to levy the contents
of his foreign safe deposit box to satisfy the tax debt.2"6 The plaintiffs alleged that a wrongful
levy had taken place.
The government argued, inter alia, that the act of state doctrine precluded the court from
reviewing the acts of the Netherlands.287 Applying the Kirkpatrick test, the court found that
because the government's acts were by themselves a levy, the plaintiffs had stated a claim
without regard to the Dutch acts. Thus, the court denied the government's motion to dismiss.
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